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ABSTRACT
THE ROLE OF PERCEIVED SOCIAL NORMS 
ON ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE FALSE CONSENSUS EFFECT
by
Kathleen P. Bauman 
University of New Hampshire, May, 1997
This paper examined the role of perceived social norms in relation to people's 
attitudes and behavioral intentions, specifically in regards to the false consensus effect 
(FCE). People are prone to numerous biases in judgments about peers’ beliefs, 
including overestimating support for their own position (i.e., false consensus). These 
misperceptions can then shape people's beliefs and guide their behavior. This series of 
studies assessed the influence of this type of misperception on attitudes and behavioral 
intentions regarding controversial social issues. Study 1 demonstrated that people 
displayed false consensus for current social issues. Alterations in wording and order of 
presentation did not affect the findings. Study 2 showed that this bias subsequently 
predicts behavioral intentions in a modified test of the theory of reasoned action. Study 
3 reduced the false consensus effect by exposing participants to information supporting 
both sides of social issues. Recommendations for interventions that effectively change 
and promote beneficial social norms are discussed.
xiv
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I. INTRODUCTION
Social norms exert powerful influences on individuals, an observation which was 
clearly demonstrated by Asch's (1955) seminal work on conformity. Consequently, 
people's behavior is often constrained or shaped by norms adopted by their peer groups. 
Social norms are defined as rules and expectations for behavior in the group (Taylor, 
Peplau, & Sears, 1994). For many attitudinal issues, there are no objectively correct 
answers, so norms are derived from judgments of people's behavior. Basing this source 
of knowledge on observations or conversations with close friends can be potentially 
harmful because erroneous estimates can give individuals a biased perspective on the 
world.
People tend to overestimate support for their beliefs relative to people who hold 
different views (see review by Mullen, Atkins, Champion, Edwards, Hardy, Story, & 
Vanderklok (1985)). Ross, Greene, and House (1977) referred to this tendency as the 
false consensus effect (FCE). Another study that examined norms about alcohol use on 
college campuses demonstrated that typical students engaged in drinking behavior with 
which they were personally uncomfortable because they perceived the norms to be 
supportive of excessive drinking (Prentice & Miller, 1993). Obviously, this 
inaccurate assessment of norms is problematic and can lead to negative outcomes. 
Consequently, it is important to study the potential influences of social norms on 
behavior. Therefore, this set of studies will address the development of social norms and 
their impact on social behavior, specifically in regards to the false consensus bias.
Several key assumptions related to norm perception must be reviewed. First, it 
is important to show that people do in fact base their behavior and attitudes on social 
norms. Next, it is necessary to examine how people come to understand social norms. 
Research suggests that people have some difficulty estimating dispersion in social
1
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distributions because they are prone to several systematic biases (Funder, 1987; 
Nisbett & Kunda, 1985), including false consensus. Finally, it is necessary to 
determine if these misperceptions can influence people's behavior. These 
misperceptions will be discussed specifically in relation to Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) 
theory of reasoned action. According to this theory, volitional behavior is a function of 
one's behavioral intentions which are produced by attitudes toward the behavior and 
subjective norms toward performing that behavior. Consequently, people's 
interpretations of social norms might incorrectly bias their responses and subsequent 
behavior.
Social Influence
Although a substantial body of psychological research has examined the influence 
of social norms, it has been limited mostly to the laboratory. The classic social 
influence studies conducted by Asch (1955) and Sherif (1936) utilized norms that 
were created as part of the experiment. Solomon Asch (1955) was specifically 
interested in how social forces shaped people's opinions and attitudes. On the basis of 
early social psychological research which suggested that people were easily swayed by 
persuasion and guided by public opinion, Asch questioned the stability of individuals' 
attitudes. He believed that people were less susceptible to group pressures than earlier 
research suggested. Consequently, he conducted a series of studies to test people's 
willingness to conform to the prescribed social norm. Participants were informed that 
they were involved in a study testing visual judgment in which they would be asked to 
compare a standard line to three comparison lines. In the standard paradigm, a single 
subject was introduced into a group containing seven to nine confederates. The 
experiment was designed so that each group member publicly selected the matching line 
with the stipulation that the actual subject always responded after the majority of the 
participants had stated their answers. Overall, Asch found that subjects conformed by 
choosing the incorrect option selected by the confederates on 37% of the trials. In these
2
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experiments, participants followed the norms established by the group in about one 
third of the trials, even though the correct answer was clearly apparent (i.e., control 
subjects made errors on this task in less than one percent of the trials). The power of 
these socially dictated norms was most strikingly demonstrated when subjects chose a 
line that was as much as seven inches longer than the target (Asch, 1955).
Sherif s (1936) earlier research demonstrated that this type of normative 
influence continued even after subjects had been removed from the group setting. He 
asked subjects to judge the distance that a pinpoint of light moved in a darkened room. In 
actuality, the light did not move as the illusion is due to the autokinetic effect (which 
occurs because the visual system cannot adjust for minor movements of the eye without a 
frame of reference), so this stimulus provided more latitude for different 
interpretations. He believed that people prefer to have consensus rather than 
disagreement in most social situations. Consequently, people are willing to change their 
own beliefs or behavior to produce agreement. When people were placed in this situation 
alone, they developed their own individual standards forjudging the movement of the 
light. But when Sherif asked people to state their judgments aloud in a group setting, the 
individual estimates converged with the other subjects. Furthermore, subjects 
continued to use the standard that had emerged in the group when they made subsequent 
estimates alone. Therefore, his research demonstrated the powerful effects of socially 
established norms.
This type of responding can be attributed to several types of influence, including 
informational, normative, and interpersonal (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Informational 
influence occurs when people seek information from peers in uncertain situations. In 
Sherif s study, the subjects lacked any actual external standard (i.e., there was no right 
answer). Therefore, they used information from the other subjects to help guide their 
judgments. Normative influence occurs when people change their actions to fit the social 
norms of the situation. Basically, this type of influence helps people decide what is the
3
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socially appropriate way to respond in a particular situation. Sherif showed that 
subjects in his experiment were also susceptible to normative influences. He discovered 
that people continued to rely on the group answer even when they left the room 
suggesting that they were still being influenced by social norms. Last, interpersonal 
influence refers to social responses that selectively encourage conformity and discourage 
or punish nonconformity. This factor was especially strong in Asch's research because 
participants experienced strong social pressure to conform to the group.
While this experimental research was paramount in studying the influence of 
social norms, these findings did not extend beyond the confines of the laboratory setting. 
Therefore, it seems important to study the development of social norms in a more 
naturalistic setting. In a classic study of political attitudes, Newcomb (1943) 
documented the shifts in beliefs at Bennington College. Most of the students during that 
time came from relatively conservative families, so freshmen tended to express 
conservative attitudes. The graduating class usually possessed rather liberal attitudes. 
Newcomb reasoned that students acquired new attitudes from their classmates and the 
college faculty through a social learning process. Although they initially held 
conservative values, observation of other students and professors shifted their attitudes 
toward more liberal beliefs, especially if they associated with other liberal students. 
Newcomb also observed that individuals who were family oriented and did not take part 
in campus events tended to remain conservative. Finally, he noted that these beliefs 
tended to remain stable over the lifespan after the college experience. Clearly, this 
study demonstrates the powerful influence that social norms can exert, but how was this 
information conveyed to the students? Newcomb's research did not specifically address 
the process by which students came to perceive the liberal tendencies on campus.
An ethnographic study of adolescent Scottish boys' views about sex offers some 
insight into the development of social norms (Wight, 1994). This study showed that 
boys get most of their information about sexual roles and norms from friends, followed
4
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
by television and parents. Television seems to provide role models and social scripts, 
while parents more frequently give factual information about sexually transmitted 
disease and birth control. However, the bulk of the boys' information was derived from 
conversations with friends. On average, though, the boys were reluctant to appear 
inexperienced or uninformed, so they went to great lengths to mask their lack of 
knowledge, which has some interesting consequences. Because of the inherent taboo 
surrounding frank discussions of sexuality, most boys found it difficult to get honest 
answers or information. Additionally, they tended to make up or embellish stories in 
order to appear 'macho' to their friends. One boy stated that "You exaggerate. Probably 
nearly everyone does, you know” (Wight, 1994, p. 721). Both of these factors led to 
inaccurate beliefs about the norms being repeated and perpetrated. In fact, the author 
stated that "to avoid ridicule, the boys not only conform to a conventional and rather 
restricted norm of masculinity, but..., they actively affirm and reproduce this norm to 
avoid being targeted for jibes” (Wight, 1994, p. 720). The author also noted that 
there was a large discrepancy between what the boys were willing to admit in private 
discussions compared to group sessions. It seems that their personal behavior was quite 
different from the image they typically presented to their peers, which led to a 
persistent misconception of appropriate sexual norms.
Other cross-cultural studies have examined the development of social and 
cultural norms. Flynn (1994) conducted a study on attitudes toward corporal 
punishment. The author cited Sweden as a liberal country that enacted legislation to 
outlaw physical punishment. Although there was no penalty for spanking children, the 
government hoped to create a cultural norm prohibiting this type of punishment. Using 
a similar technique, many American schools have eliminated corporal punishment from 
schools in an effort to force parents to question the valge of this technique. These 
administrators are hoping to create a climate in which spanking becomes less normative 
(Flynn, 1994). Obviously, these techniques rest on the assumption that changing
5
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normative beliefs in the population can have a profound effect on behavior. These studies 
also reinforce the idea that people look to their peers in order to determine the norms of 
the group. Festinger's social comparison research offers some insight on how this 
process works.
Social Comparison
Festinger (1954) originally discussed social comparison as a means of 
establishing social norms when no objective criteria existed. He stated that individuals 
evaluate their opinions and abilities based on other people. In other words, they use 
other people to ensure that their beliefs conform to social norms and to confirm their 
perceptions of social reality. Festinger elucidated a number of hypotheses about the 
social comparison process. First, he stated that people possess a drive to evaluate their 
opinions and abilities. Second, he hypothesized that people would evaluate their opinions 
and abilities by comparison with others, only when objective, non-social means were 
not available. Third, social comparison decreases when the differences between the 
comparison groups increases. In other words, people do not use dissimilar people as 
reference groups. Additionally, he stated that any factors which increase the importance 
of a particular group would strengthen their role as a comparison group and increase 
conformity. Based on these premises, a number of assertions can be made. First, 
attitudes about social issues clearly do not have objective criteria. Furthermore, college 
students most likely rely on their peers as a reference group. Thus, estimates of peers' 
beliefs are probably strong determinants of people's perceptions of the social norms on 
campus. Therefore, it is necessary to establish the source of students’ norms, which is 
one of the goals of this project. Festinger's theory has broad ranging applications, 
particularly for psychologists attempting to understand and measure people's opinions 
or attitudes (see also Suls and Wills, 1991; Wood, 1989).
While Festinger's research suggests that people are motivated to seek 
confirmation from their peers, other research has shown that people have difficulty
6
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correctly performing this task (Nisbett & Kunda, 1985). By presenting subjects with a 
number of issues and asking them to estimate the distribution of people across a 10- 
point scale, the researchers concluded that people have some difficulty accurately 
estimating social norms concerning a range of attitudinal issues and behaviors (e.g., 
defense spending and going to concerts). Furthermore, they found that people make 
systematic errors when attempting to judge their peer's beliefs, including pluralistic 
ignorance, false consensus, and false uniqueness.
Biases
Pluralistic Ignorance
One bias which leads people to make inaccurate assessments about people's 
attitudes is pluralistic ignorance which occurs when people publicly display similar 
beliefs and behaviors, while holding different underlying attitudes (Prentice & Miller, 
1993). Miller and Prentice (1994) have recently outlined three ways in which 
pluralistic ignorance can develop. First, it can reflect a public norm enforced by a vocal 
minority, such as a religious group. Second, it may represent an idealized norm, rather 
than accurate individual beliefs. Finally, it can derive from an outdated public norm 
which continues to exert influence even though it has lost private support (e.g., racial 
desegregation).
The term was first used in 1924 by Floyd Allport who defined pluralistic 
ignorance as a "situation in which virtually all members of a group privately reject 
group norms yet believe that virtually all other group members accept them" (Miller & 
McFarland, 1987, p. 298). Fifty years later, this concept was reformulated by Latane 
and Darley (1970) as an explanation for the bystander effect. They reasoned that 
people's failure to respond to an emergency was due in part to the audience's uncertainty 
about an ambiguous situation. So, the members look to other people who are presumably 
undergoing the same decision-making process, but outwardly they are all maintaining a 
calm facade. Based on this information, people do not construe the situation as an
7
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emergency which leads to bystander apathy. Although pluralistic ignorance served as an 
explanation in this research, it has not received much empirical research as an 
independent area of study.
Miller and McFarland (1987) conducted one of the first experiments to explain 
pluralistic ignorance. They observed that students are often very reluctant to ask 
questions in class, so they reasoned that people behave similarly but individuals believe 
that their behavior is shaped by different forces than their peers. Thus, they 
hypothesized that people believe that a fear of embarrassment is sufficient cause to deter 
their behavior, while other people's inaction must be due to different reasons. In other 
words, students do not ask questions about difficult concepts because they are afraid of 
appearing unintelligent, but they believe that their classmates refrain from asking 
questions because they have a solid grasp of the material. In a series of studies, they 
concluded that people do demonstrate pluralistic ignorance concerning the origins of 
behavior. First, they presented subjects with a number of different traits and asked 
them to estimate the prevalence of these characteristics for themselves and their peers. 
As predicted, they found that participants believed that they possessed more 
characteristics that result in social inhibition (e.g., inhibited, self-conscious, and 
hesitant) than their peers. In the remaining three studies, they obtained ratings from 
subjects about their likelihood to engage in either actual or hypothetical embarrassing 
situations. Then, they compared these scores to their estimates and explanations for 
their peers' behavior. In all of the studies, they found that subjects overestimated the 
number of other students who would engage in the embarrassing act (e.g., ask for help in 
interpreting a purposefully vague journal article) and inaccurately reported the 
reasoning for these behaviors (e.g., the other students did not ask for help because they 
actually understood the article).
Another recent study by Prentice and Miller (1993) examined social norms 
concerning alcohol use at universities. Although underage drinking is the norm on most
8
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college campuses, the authors argued that most students only publicly conform to this 
standard, but privately hold conflicting beliefs. In a series of interviews, they asked 
students about their alcohol usage and their estimates of their peers' drinking habits.
All of the findings supported the pluralistic ignorance hypothesis; subjects believed that 
they were more uncomfortable with drinking on campus than their peers and their 
friends. Furthermore, they found that males were more likely to shift their private 
attitudes towards the perceived group norms in order to avoid feeling deviant. In this 
case, misperception of the social norm is clearly affecting behavior and could have 
dangerous ramifications.
Pluralistic ignorance has been related to various other social concerns. The 
inability to assess people's private attitudes can lead people to incorrectly perceive 
support for their behaviors. For example, researchers have shown that pluralistic 
ignorance has been used as an explanation for racial segregation (O'Gorman, 1975).
This phenomenon has also been related to opinions concerning environmental issues 
(Taylor, 1982) and parolees' perception of the justice system, such that ex-offenders 
underestimate the extent of police harassment (Berman, 1976). In general, this 
research suggests that people do in fact misinterpret underlying private attitudes which 
may bias their own personal behavior.
False Consensus
People may also attempt to validate their beliefs by projecting (see Holmes,
1968) their own characteristics onto other individuals, which has been demonstrated by 
the false consensus effect (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). Based on the attribution 
literature, this theory states that people tend to overestimate the degree of similarity 
between themselves and their peers relative to people who hold an opposing view. More 
specifically, people who support a given position, such as abortion, would believe that 
more people are in favor of this position, while people who are opposed (e.g., pro-life) 
would estimate that fewer people agree with abortion.
9
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In the original test of this theory, subjects were presented with a series of 
vignettes followed by two behavioral options (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). For 
example, in one scenario, people were interviewed at a grocery store and asked if their 
responses could be used for a television commercial. Subjects were asked to indicate 
what percentage of their peers would engage in each choice (e.g., would sign the release 
for the TV station or would refuse to sign the release). Following these ratings, they 
selected which outcome they would be most likely to choose. In support of the 
hypothesis, subjects who picked a particular option rated that response as more common 
in people in general. In other words, people who would sign the release predicted that 
76% of the general population would also sign the release. However, people who refused 
this request believed that only 57% of the population would agree to such a request. To 
extend the findings, a second study was conducted which presented a number of different 
categories, such as personal traits and views (e.g., competitive), personal preferences 
(e.g., brown bread versus white bread), political expectations (e.g., women in Supreme 
Court within decade) and personal characteristics (e.g., first born). Findings from most 
of the categories supported the false consensus hypothesis which consequently extended 
its domain. The final two studies utilized actual behavioral measures to assess the 
generalizability of the findings, which provided additional support for the false 
consensus theory. People who agreed to a particular behavior (e.g., wear a sign) were 
more likely to believe that others would also engage in such an act. The authors 
concluded that false consensus is a robust effect evidenced by the generality across topics 
(c.f., van der Pligt, 1984) and the behavioral data.
A meta-analysis conducted by Mullen and his colleagues (1985) supported the 
original conclusions. In 115 tests of the false consensus hypothesis, Mullen et al. 
concluded that it is a statistically significant finding with a moderate effect size.
Detailed analyses of the studies suggested that the effect is not influenced by the type of 
reference population (e.g., peers versus the general population). However, the number
10
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of behavioral estimates and the order of presentation did influence the findings. More 
specifically, fewer options and peer estimates made prior to the self ratings were shown 
to produce larger effect sizes. In general, this finding is quite robust and well- 
documented, suggesting that people's estimates of social norms may be systematically 
biased in the direction of support for their own beliefs. Not all of the research supports 
this finding though.
False Uniqueness
Researchers (e.g., McFarland & Miller, 1990; Suls & Wan, 1987) have 
reported occasionally that there was also a false uniqueness effect, which is defined as a 
systematic underestimation of self-other similarity. This finding has been shown in 
diverse areas. For example, people believe that they are happier, more intelligent, and 
less prejudiced than others (McFarland & Miller, 1990). These findings suggest that 
false uniqueness occurs when the traits or characteristics are positive in nature, 
because possessing more or less of these traits is advantageous or socially desirable.
Based on a survey of psychological fears, Suls and Wan (1987) found that 
subjects with high fear ratings overestimated the number of other subjects who also 
possessed similar phobias, thus demonstrating false consensus. However, subjects who 
were less afraid, tended to underestimate the absence of fear among their peers, 
suggesting that false uniqueness was occurring. Based on their research, it appears that 
both false uniqueness and false consensus can appear depending on which produces more 
desirable outcomes. Marks (1984) demonstrated that people believe that their abilities 
are unique (e.g., they are the best basketball player), but their opinions are common 
(e.g., most people support Ross Perot). However, Valins and Nisbett (1972) described 
the experience of new soldiers sent to Vietnam who felt isolated and afraid, because they 
believed that no one else shared their fears. In this case, feeling unique caused these 
soldiers a great deal of distress. Clearly, different motivational strategies underlie 
these results.
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Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that both false uniqueness and false 
consensus can occur simultaneously depending on the type of measurement used. 
McFarland and Miller (1990) described two aversive psychological experiments to 
their subjects; the first involved a potentially embarrassing situation and the second 
concerned viewing some unpleasant film clips of medical procedures. After hearing the 
descriptions, they asked the subjects to choose the experiment in which they would least 
prefer to participate. Subjects were also asked to indicate the percentage of other 
students who would make the same selection. Last, they were asked to rate on a 9-point 
Likert scale their degree of discomfort and how uncomfortable the average student would 
be if they participated in the more aversive study. Results showed that false consensus 
did occur in the percentage ratings; subjects overestimated the number of fellow 
students who would make the same choice. However, a false uniqueness effect was found 
when examining the ratings. Individuals believed that they would be more uncomfortable 
than their peers. Therefore, the type of information sought has been shown to influence 
people's expectations.
In order to discriminate between the three different types of biases, it is 
important to understand their similarities and differences. False consensus and 
uniqueness both refer to inaccurate estimates of peer support; however, when false 
consensus occurs, people overestimate support, but when false uniqueness is found, 
people underestimate the percentage of peers who share their position relative to 
individuals who hold the opposing position. Pluralistic ignorance simply refers to a 
tendency to inaccurately identify the majority's beliefs based on manifested behavior. In 
cases when a group of people are outwardly acting in a similar manner, pluralistic 
ignorance takes place when each individual believes that they are behaving in that 
manner for a different reason than the other group members. Therefore, pluralistic 
ignorance refers to a false belief based on observations of overt behavior. False
12
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consensus and uniqueness can refer to behaviors, but also include personality traits and 
attitudes.
Explanations
Several explanations have been generated to explain these seemingly 
contradictory findings. Clearly, people do not possess accurate information about 
people's beliefs. Previous research has demonstrated that people have difficulty 
correctly identifying dispersion in social distributions (Nisbett & Kunda, 1985). 
However, this explanation could result in false uniqueness or false consensus depending 
on which direction people tend to err. Consequently, it is important to understand what 
causes people to overestimate or underestimate support for their position.
Numerous cognitive explanations have been proposed for these findings. In these 
cases, people are not consciously altering their perceptions, but they are making an 
error in judgment. Often, selective exposure may account for their inaccurate estimates 
(Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). People tend to associate with similar others, thus 
reinforcing the idea that their beliefs are relatively common. Additionally, the 
availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) suggests that people overestimate 
support for their position because they are basing their judgment on a limited sample of 
similar individuals which is recalled more easily when people are asked to make 
judgments about their peers. On the other hand, if people believe that they are a 
minority in a given population, the availability heuristic might lead to an 
underestimation of support. For example, if a person is pro-choice at a strict Catholic 
school, he or she may feel that he or she is the only person to hold such a belief, which 
could lead to false uniqueness. Furthermore, based on pluralistic ignorance, people may 
outwardly demonstrate similar behaviors while holding different private attitudes (e.g., 
they may all attend Sunday mass, while still believing abortion is acceptable).
The salience or the focus of the issue may also distort consensus beliefs (Marks & 
Miller, 1987). In other words, if the subjects are primed to think about their
13
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particular viewpoint, it is easy to reason that they would increase consensus for that 
position. On the other hand, if they are asked to focus on both sides of an issue, it may 
decrease the likelihood of false consensus. Last, people may attribute their behavior or 
beliefs to situational forces and believe that others are similarly affected by these 
factors, thus causing false consensus (Giiovich, Jennings, & Jennings, 1983).
However, according to the actor-observer effect (Jones & Davis, 1965), people tend to 
attribute other people's behavior to dispositional causes which might invoke false 
uniqueness.
Sherman, Chassin, Presson, and Agostinelli (1984) attempted to address the 
underlying cognitive basis for the false consensus effect. They generated two predictions 
based on cognitive consistency theory: the similarity principle and the evaluation 
principle. The similarity principle argues that people believe that similar others 
possess similar characteristics. Therefore, the false consensus effect is reflecting 
direct projection of traits by individuals onto their peers. On the other hand, the 
evaluation principle explanation assumes that people are making stereotypical 
judgments about other positive individuals by judging that these people possess positive 
characteristics (e.g., “what is beautiful is good stereotype”; Dion, Berscheid, & 
Walster, 1972)). The fact that the FCE seems to be reflecting projection is a by­
product of the fact that people also assume that they too possess desirable qualities.
Sherman et al. (1984) argued that these types of influence would function 
differently based on the topic being judged. Issues for which all people would agree that 
one dimension is good or bad (e.g., kindness) or that neither dimension is preferable 
(e.g., salt versus pepper) are labeled universally evaluated qualities. On the other hand, 
topics for which people disagree about the desirability of the traits are considered 
variably evaluated qualities (e.g., capital punishment). A series of studies showed that 
people are generally using the evaluation principle, as larger false consensus effects 
were produced on variably rated issues. If similarity were being evoked, the effects
14
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would be found on both universal and variably rated topics (Sherman e t al., 1984). 
Thus, people are not directly projecting their own qualities onto peers, which suggests 
that people’s beliefs (i.e., attitudes) might not correlate highly with their false 
consensus estimates.
Another study attempted to determine the basis of the false consensus effect by 
comparing social projection to social conformity (Marks, Graham, & Hansen, 1992). 
Social projection assumes that people are basing their estimates on their personal 
attitudes, while social comparison suggests that people are basing their attitudes on 
their perceptions of their peers. The fact that studies that ask peers to give consensus 
estimates before they describe their endorsement show larger effect sizes for the false 
consensus effect lends some support to the social comparison explanation. In an attempt 
to establish which method has a greater impact on people’s perceptions, Marks, Graham, 
and Hansen (1992) measured adolescent alcohol use over the course of a year (from the 
start of seventh grade through eighth grade). Students were asked a series of questions 
including their personal alcohol usage and their estimates of peer alcohol use. While 
they found a slightly stronger effect for social conformity, they reasoned that both 
accounts probably contribute to adolescents’ decision to use alcohol. Furthermore, their 
theory takes both cognitive and motivational limitations into consideration.
Other researchers have espoused motivational explanations. Marks, Miller, and 
Maruyama (1981) have shown that people perceive more similarity between 
themselves and physically attractive individuals. Additionally, people displayed a larger 
FCE when they anticipate meeting a target individual in the future (Miller & Marks,
1982). According to social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), people need to 
justify ambiguous opinions and abilities by comparing themselves to peers. Thus, 
overestimating consensus can increase people's self-esteem by providing support for 
their beliefs. It also serves an ego-defensive function (Katz, 1960) when people 
perceive their positive characteristics or desired attitudes as rare and their negative
15
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traits as prevalent Viewing negative traits or outcomes as relatively common may also 
help to reduce anxiety about deviance. Campbell (1986) found that people 
overestimated support for their opinions, but underestimated consensus for their 
abilities, suggesting that inaccurately perceiving consensus can serve to protect the ego 
by enhancing positive traits and bolster self-esteem by providing support for attitudes. 
As evidence of this motivational drive, under conditions of failure, people are especially 
likely to commit the false consensus bias (Sherman, Presson, & Chassin, 1984).
A second motivational explanation is the desire to be unique, in which individuals 
want to be distinctive from their peers (Fromkin, 1972; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980). 
These psychologists stress people's need for independence and a unique self-image. If 
this need is aroused, it can lead to perceptions of false uniqueness. Furthermore, 
portraying oneself as different from peers may bolster one's self-esteem. Keams 
(1984) examined the role of this desire for uniqueness and found that individual 
differences in the need for uniqueness did affect the false consensus effect Consequently, 
this drive may influence some subjects' responses relative to their more conforming 
peers.
A final explanation stems from pluralistic ignorance by which people view a 
particular behavior as relatively common and therefore acceptable (Sherman, Presson, 
Chassin, Corty, & Olshavsky, 1983). In other words, individuals may attempt to match 
their behavior to a perceived majority's actions. Therefore, they overestimate the 
relative frequency of a particular attitude on the basis of people’s actions. The problem 
lies in the fact that the behavior is not an accurate reflection of the underlying attitude 
(see Prentice & Miller, 1983).
All of the alternative theories offer possible explanations for distortions in 
judgments of consensus. However, few researchers have attempted to determine if 
cognitive or motivational factors have a greater impact on false consensus beliefs. 
Sherman, Presson, Chassin, Corty, and Olshavsky (1983) conducted a study to
16
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determine the underlying mechanism of false consensus. They divided the possible 
causes into four categories: selective exposure, motivation distortions, causal 
attribution, and behavioral (social) conformity. Overall, they found that adolescents 
were more prone to false consensus than adults and selective exposure was the best 
predictor. Therefore, this set of studies will attempt to provide a measure of the 
inaccuracies of judgment and an explanation for these perceptions.
Summary
Thus far, it has been demonstrated that people are influenced by social norms 
(e.g., Asch and Newcomb). Furthermore, the research conducted on pluralistic 
ignorance, false consensus, and false uniqueness supports Nisbett and Kunda's (1985) 
assertion that people make systematic errors in interpreting the social norms. 
Therefore, it is important to establish direct links between social norms and behavior in 
order to conclude that misperceptions can have consequences for behavior. Fishbein and 
Ajzen's (1975) theory of reasoned action provides solid evidence that social norms do in 
fact mediate behavior.
Theory of Reasoned Action 
As stated earlier, the theory of reasoned action states that behavior can be 
predicted from behavioral intentions which in turn are a function of attitudes toward the 
behavior and subjective norms. Ajzen (1988) defined subjective norms as “the 
person's perception of social pressure to perform or not perform the behavior under 
consideration” (p. 117). Subjective norms consist of two components: normative 
beliefs (i.e., beliefs concerning how important others [referents] want an individual to 
behave) and motivation to comply (with these referents) (Fishbein, 1979). Thus, 
subjective norms typically arise from perceptions of friends' and family members' 
beliefs. They are experimentally assessed by asking respondents to judge their 
perceptions of various groups' approval for a particular behavior.
17
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In a standard test of this theory, multiple regression analyses are conducted in 
which attitudes and subjective norms are entered as predictor variables. In a series of 
studies conducted by Ajzen, Fishbein, and their colleagues (1980), they found both 
predictors (i.e., attitudes and norms) to be significant in explaining the use of birth 
control pills, breast feeding, church attendance, the decision to have an abortion or 
another child, voting behavior, and the likelihood of entering an alcohol treatment 
center. While attitudes explained a larger percentage of the variance in most of these 
areas, norms were found to be more important predictors in the decision to have an 
abortion or another child. These findings make sense in light of the role that referents 
would play in these types of decisions.
Van den Putte's (1991) meta-analysis of 113 studies demonstrated that 
behavioral intentions were strongly predicted by attitudes and subjective norms. 
Furthermore, intentions were also significantly related to actual behavior. Additional 
research has emphasized the importance of studying subjective norms in relation to a 
number of social issues, so studies which addressed the importance of norms will be 
discussed.
In a study that examined driving behavior, Stasson and Fishbein (1990) found 
that subjective norms were highly predictive of people's intentions to wear seat belts 
under dangerous driving conditions, while attitudes were a better predictor when 
conditions were safe. Another study conducted by Parker, Manstead, and Stradling 
(1995) confirmed the importance of social norms in relation to driving violations, 
including cutting across traffic to exit a highway, consistently changing lanes in slow- 
moving traffic, and overtaking on the inside. Additionally, they considered the 
differential impact of moral (personal) norms versus social norms. They defined 
personal norms as "an individual's internalized moral rules" and social norms as "an 
individual's perceptions about what others would want him or her to do" (Parker, 
Manstead, & Stradling, 1995, p. 129). Both types of norms were found to be significant
18
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predictors of intention to engage in these risky behaviors. This research seems to 
suggest that people are more influenced by normative pressure in ambiguous situations, 
which is supported by social comparison research (Festinger, 1954). Furthermore, 
ambiguous situations might not be frequently discussed, so people are forced to rely on 
observations in order to derive the appropriate social norms.
This idea was supported by Cummings and Comey's (1987) paper on gambling 
behavior. They attempted to use the theory of reasoned action as a model for explaining 
various gambling activities. Based on this theory, the researchers argued that intention 
to gamble would be based on attitudes toward gambling and subjective norms regarding 
this activity, as well as personality and demographic characteristics. They 
conceptualized subjective norms by assessing normative beliefs (e.g., "My church 
thinks I should go to Las Vegas to gamble on my next vacation") and motivation to comply 
with these beliefs (e.g., "Generally speaking, I do what the church expects of me"). It is 
interesting to note that they suggested that people's normative beliefs may not accurately 
represent the true beliefs of their reference groups, but their perceptions guide 
behavior.
The fact that perceptions rather than reality direct behavior is particularly 
relevant when considering dangerous behaviors which are strongly influenced by peer 
pressure, such as drinking and drug abuse. Laflin, Moore-Hirschi, Weis, and Hayes 
(1994) examined the influence of subjective norms on high school and college students' 
drug use behavior. They utilized questions which tapped subjective norms including 
items such as "Drug abuse is a serious social problem." They found a high positive 
correlation between drug attitudes and subjective norms, suggesting that personal 
acceptance of drug use is highly related to a tendency to perceive permissive social 
norms for engaging in illegal drug use. Furthermore, subjective norms were found to be 
highly predictive of drug and alcohol use. Wilks, Callan, and Austin (1989) specifically 
examined the influence of various groups on adolescent drinking. They concluded that
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fathers' actual alcohol use and perceptions of friends' drinking habits were highly 
predictive of both boys' and girls' drinking practices. However, females were less 
influenced by norms as their drinking was related more to personal attitudes. 
Nonetheless, the influence of the peer group cannot be underestimated at this critical 
period in adolescents' lives.
Much of the research examining the theory of reasoned action deals with safe sex 
practices. Terry, Gailigan, and Conway (1993) examined people's likelihood to engage 
in a variety of different strategies, including engaging in an exclusive sexual 
relationship, avoiding casual sex, and asking sexual partners about their previous 
sexual experience and drug use history. Their findings suggested that norms do play an 
important role in influencing sexual practices, especially in regards to interactions 
with casual partners (c.f., Morrison, Gillmore & Baker, 1995). In particular, they 
concluded that peer support was especially relevant in curtailing promiscuous behavior 
(i.e., having sexual relations with many partners). Therefore, they recommended that 
intervention programs should focus on encouraging peer support for safer sexual 
practices. Numerous other researchers have documented the conclusion that subjective 
norms are predictive of intentions to engage in safe sexual behaviors (Chan & Fishbein, 
1993; Gallois, Terry, & Timmons, 1994; Morrison, Gillmore, & Baker, 1995; 
Tashakkori & Thompson, 1992; White, Terry, & Hogg, 1994).
Ross and McLaws (1992) demonstrated that subjective norms about condom 
usage were better predictors of actual usage than attitudes for 173 homosexual males. 
While past behavior was also shown to be an important factor, personal attitudes were 
only weakly related to behavior. Therefore, the authors concluded that peer-based 
education would be more effective in combating dangerous sexual practices than changing 
attitudes toward the use of precautions.
These findings have been employed by researchers attempting to develop effective 
mass-media campaigns directed at preventing AIDS. Fishbein and his colleagues
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(1993a; 1993b) conducted a longitudinal study comparing AIDS knowledge, beliefs, and 
practices in several Caribbean countries. By measuring residents' knowledge, risk 
perceptions, and attitudes toward AIDS-protective behavior, they were able to determine 
what factors should be emphasized in a campaign directed at these countries. Based on 
the theory of reasoned action, one specific goal was to increase normative pressure 
concerning condom use. Two categories of normative questions were posed: behavioral 
norms and normative beliefs. To assess behavioral norms, participants were asked 
several questions tapping the role that their friends and sexual partners played in 
influencing condom usage (e.g., "Do you and your friends ever talk about using 
condoms?"). As a measure of normative beliefs, subjects were asked to indicate the 
level of influence of three reference groups: parents, sexual partners, and close friends. 
The researchers concluded that the campaign was successful in increasing the normative 
belief that potential dating partners supported the use of condoms. Furthermore, they 
stated that "the data clearly indicated that perceived normative pressure was a key 
determinant of condom use in these populations" (Middlestadt et al., 1995, p. 22). 
Specifically, personal condom use was predicted from beliefs about friends' acceptance of 
this practice obtained through conversation about sexual topics.
Trafimow (1994) more closely examined the influence of normative pressure in 
regard to condom use. He cited findings from the longitudinal study conducted in the 
Caribbean as evidence that subjective norms were the best predictor of safe sexual 
practices. However, norms still only explained approximately 34% of the variance in 
people's behaviors, so he argued that another important factor had been overlooked in the 
analyses. He believed that this factor was confidence in the correctness of norm 
perception (i.e., how certain are people in their judgments of sexual partners’ beliefs). 
Consequently, he examined the influence of certainty and found that confidence in norm 
judgment mediated behavioral intentions. College students rated the likelihood of condom 
use in hypothetical scenarios where their partner's desire was sure or unsure. They
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also rated their own attitudes about condom use, normative pressure to use condoms, and 
confidence in perceptions of partner's preferences. He found significant differences in 
people's likelihood to use a condom based on their certainty ratings of their partner's 
preferences. Furthermore, he concluded that "intentions to use condoms seem to be 
driven more by perceptions of normative pressure than by attitudes" (Trafimow, 1994, 
p. 2157), especially for extremely confident subjects. Trafimow also addressed the 
source of high levels of confidence in perceptions related to sexual practices. He 
concluded that people's certainty is probably derived from experience or based on 
individual differences in person perception (e.g., people with high self-esteem simply 
perceive themselves as good intuiters of people's beliefs). While these explanations may 
account for varying levels of certainty, they still do not directly address the source or 
the accuracy of the norms. However, it does emphasize the fact that confident people are 
probably likely to base their behavior on their perceptions, even if they are not 
reflective of peers' beliefs.
In related research, Kelly and his colleagues (1991, 1992) examined the 
importance of social norms in relation to high-risk homosexual behavior. In order to 
effectively eliminate this type of behavior, Kelly trained leaders in the gay community 
to endorse safer sexual practices. This technique was based on the premise that high 
status individuals within these communities would be able to alter the normative 
standards for behavior. They successfully reduced the level of high-risk behavior by 
approximately 25%, which demonstrated that modifying social norms can be helpful in 
changing behavior.
Conclusion
Evidence from the numerous studies on the theory of reasoned action suggest that 
subjective norms play an important role in predicting behavior. However, White,
Terry, and Hogg (1994) found that group norms were also predictive of intentions to 
use a condom. In their study of sexually active undergraduates, they included a measure
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of group norms (the extent to which the behavior is judged to be normatively 
appropriate) as well as subjective norms. They reasoned that group norms might be 
more important in situations in which referents do not have clearly expressed 
expectations regarding particular behaviors. Therefore, future research should include 
an assessment of group norms when studying socially sensitive issues which may not be 
openly discussed. Additionally, it is equally important to consider the source and 
accuracy of these norms.
In closing, these findings are encouraging because they suggest that it is possible 
to reduce the frequency of dangerous behavior by changing people's perceptions of the 
norms. Therefore, research in this area should be expanded to include intervention 
techniques aimed at restructuring people's subjective norms, including beliefs 
concerning driving, drug use, and sexual behavior. This set of studies was designed to 
measure the source of norms for social issues and the role of misperceptions, namely the 
false consensus bias, on socially relevant behavior. In the final study, the 
misperceptions were addressed, so potentially dangerous behaviors can be prevented.
23
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
II. STUDY 1
A preliminary study was conducted to determine if the false consensus effect 
would be found in regard to social issues. A list of current controversial issues was 
generated to serve as stimulus topics. Order and wording effects were also measured to 
determine if variations in methodology influence this robust effect. Mullen, Driskell, 
and Smith (1989) tested the effects of sequence of measurement and wording which were 
hypothesized to affect this bias based on meta-analytic research (see Mullen et al.,
1985). They found that the false consensus effect was magnified when estimates were 
made before endorsements and when estimates were made supporting their own position. 
However, they used a single item measure (e.g., brown bread versus white bread), 




One hundred and forty-five students (44 males and 101 females) from upper 
level psychology courses volunteered to participate in the study. The subjects were 
predominantly white Catholics with an average age of 19.65 years old (SD = 2.09). 
Materials
A questionnaire was designed for this study which presented students with a 
number of current controversial social issues (abortion, euthanasia, death penalty, 
animal testing, legalization of drugs, the insanity plea, “gays in the military”, lower 
drinking age, foreign aid, mandatory seat belt laws, ban on gun sales, ban on smoking in 
public places, women in combat, immigration laws, condom distribution in high schools, 
racial quotas, and prayer in schools). The questionnaire consisted of two sections: the
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subject's own position on each issue and an estimate of the percentage of peers who held a 
particular position. Two variables were manipulated in this questionnaire: wording and 
order. The effect of wording was measured by asking half of the subjects if they were 
“in favor” of each subject and to estimate the percentage of peers who supported each 
issue. The remaining subjects were asked if they were “opposed” to each issue and to 
estimate the percentage of peers who were against each topic. Order was manipulated by 
varying the order in which the self versus peer questionnaires were presented. Half of 
the subjects were asked to give self reported positions first, while the other half gave 
peer estimates followed by self-reported position information. In total, there were four 
different combinations of questionnaires created.
Procedure
Participants were informed that they were taking part in a study on college 
students' opinions about current social issues. They were told that their responses 
would be kept completely anonymous; thus they should give honest answers. The 
questionnaires were randomly distributed to each person during class. They were 
instructed to read the information carefully and complete each item. After completing 
the materials, the experiment was explained and the students were thanked for their 
participation..
Results
It was hypothesized that people would display false consensus for the social issues 
presented. First, the effects of order and wording were examined. In order to test these 
predictions, 17 2 (order) x 2 (wording) x 2 (position) between groups MANOVAs were 
conducted with the consensus estimates on each issue as the dependent measure. In 
general, order and wording did not influence the false consensus effect, with the 
following exceptions: there were significant effects of wording for abortion, the insanity 
plea, women in combat, racial quotas, and prayer in schools, and a significant two way 
interaction found for position by wording for gun control using the Bonferroni
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correction. The effects for position were unaffected by the inclusion of order and 
wording. Additionally, there were no significant effects for order.
Because of the absence of consistent effects for these variables, the remaining 
data was analyzed collapsing across order and wording. In order to calculate consensus 
scores for people who asked to estimate the percentage of students who were opposed to 
each issue, their estimates were subtracted from 100. This computation allowed all 
participants’ scores to be compared on the same scale (i.e., what percentage of students 
do they believe support each attitude). The means and standard deviations for estimates 
for each issue are shown in Table 1. In order to determine if false consensus is present, 
t-tests were conducted between the estimates given by subjects who supported and 
opposed each issue. A FCE is indicated if there is a significant difference between the 
groups. The t  and b values are also presented in Table 1. Using a Bonferroni correction 
of e  < .003 to control for the number of comparisons, a false consensus effect was 
evident for 11 of the 17 issues.
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Table 1
T-Test Analyses to Measure False Consensus Comparing Consensus Estimates Between 





Mean fSDl TNI t p
Abortion 62.45(1 5.43)[104] 58.00(1 8 .48)[34] 1.39 .167
Euthanasia 6 1 .2 8 (2 0 .30)[99] 4 1 .09 (25 .75)[34] 4.66 .0 0 0 * *
Death penalty 56.57(1 7.44) [101 ] 51 .68 (22 .77 )[38 ] 1.20 .230
Animal testing 4 5 .3 7 (2 1 .03)[53] 2 5 .72 (20 .22)[87] 5.49 .0 0 0 * *
Drugs legalized 72.72(1 5.21 )[60] 52 .65 (21 .09)[82] 6.59 .0 0 0 * *
Insanity plea 55.73(1 7.94)[64] 45.1 3(1 7.30)[71 ] 3.50 .0 0 1 * *
Gays in the military60.42(20.83)[l 27] 46.20(1 7.43)[1 5] 2.54 .0 1 2 *
Lower drinking age83.18 (1 8.77)[89] 65.14(23.81 )[55] 5.05 .0 0 0 * *
Foreign aid 61.42(1 9.31 )[99] 44.30(1 6 .88)[37] 4.76 .000* *
Mandatory 
seatbelt laws
64 .54 (25 .4 6 )[1 1 3] 44 .36 (25 .49)[28] 3.75 .0 0 0 * *
Ban on gun sales 58 .46 (21 .27)[96] 5 2 .2 2 (2 1 .56)[46] 1.63 .106
Ban on
public smoking
53.21 (22 .20)[96] 4 4 .8 7 (2 6 .52)[47] 1.98 .050*
Women in combat 67.08 (1 8.13)[1 30] 38 .62 (23 .47)[1 3] 5.25 .0 0 0 * *
Open immigration 
laws
56.03(1 8.98)[64] 36 .34 (20 .78 ) [70] 5.71 .0 0 0 * *
Condom 7 8 .7 4 (1 7 .34 )[132] 
distribution in schools
60.50(1 9.78)[10] 3.18 .0 0 0 * *
Racial quotas 
for employment
51 .88 (22 .92)[43] 42.31 (23.1 2)[94] 2.26 .0 26 *
Prayer in 
public schools
4 9 .8 4 (2 1 .32)[25] 29.46(1 8.7 5 ) [1 1 8] 4.82 .0 0 0 * *
* fi < .05.
** Significant with Bonferroni correction (fi<.003).
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Discussion
As hypothesized, people did show a significant false consensus effect for the 
majority of issues. Furthermore, the effect was generally unaffected by slight 
alterations in wording and order of presentation. Therefore, the more conservative 
technique of asking for self endorsements first will be utilized in further studies. 
Because it has been demonstrated that people show the false consensus effect for current 
social issues, Study 2 describes its relation to behavioral intentions. Additionally, 
information concerning students’ perceptions regarding the source of their beliefs is 
discussed.
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III. STUDY 2
The previous study established that false consensus effects are consistent in 
people's views about social issues. The goal of this study is to extend this research by 
demonstrating that these biases are related to behavioral intentions. Research conducted 
by Botvin, Botvin, Baker, Dusenbury, and Goldberg (1992) demonstrated clearly that 
false consensus can affect behavior. In a study designed to predict tobacco use from 
normative beliefs, it was found that students who gave higher estimates of the prevalence 
of smoking were more likely to smoke or begin smoking. The researchers utilized a 
cross-sectional and longitudinal design, which allowed them to establish the potential 
effects of false consensus beliefs. They surveyed approximately one thousand adolescents 
during seventh and ninth grade. At both times, subjects completed a measure of self- 
reported smoking and a questionnaire tapping normative expectations about smoking, 
including estimates of peer and adult smoking prevalence. They concluded that students 
who believed that at least 50% of peers or adults smoked were significantly more likely 
to smoke. Furthermore, children in the seventh grade who did not smoke were more 
likely to have started in the ninth grade if they overestimated the prevalence of smoking 
among their peers. Overall, the researchers concluded that "adolescents tend to act in a 
way consistent with perceived norms” (Botvin et al., 1992, p. 177).
In a related study, Chassin, Presson, Sherman, Corty, and Olshavsky(l 984) 
found that normative beliefs were the best predictor of middle-school students’ 
likelihood to smoke. In this study, the authors attempted to predict smoking initiation at 
several levels: proximal variables, which were measured using Ajzen and Fishbein's 
model, distal variables, which were assessed using Jessor and Jessor's (1977) model, 
and each subjects' smoking environment. Jessor and Jessor's model examines the role of
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personality variables and social support in adolescence. They argued that many 
adolescent problems are simply premature transitions to adulthood. However, the 
researchers found that the best predictor of smoking initiation was simply the students' 
beliefs about the prevalence of tobacco use; high-risk adolescents dramatically 
overestimated that actual extent of smoking. Therefore, they authors asserted that 
"correcting adolescents' misperceptions about the extent of smoking in the population 
may be a useful addition to prevention campaigns” (Chassin et al., 1984, p. 239).
It is important to consider, though, that the researchers did not establish clear 
cause and effect relations in either experiment. Adolescents who demonstrated the false 
consensus effect and perceived smoking to be more common may have differed in 
significant ways from their peers who did not show evidence of this bias. Perhaps the 
adults and friends in their life smoked, which in turn, caused them to overestimate 
prevalence as well as begin smoking due to a social learning influence. However, this 
problem is difficult to circumvent as random assignment is not possible. Consequently, 
this study will examine the influence of perceived social norms on behavioral intentions 
across a series of issues to determine if this bias does seem to have a consistent influence 
on likelihood to engage in socially motivated behavior.
This study has three goals: (a) to assess the perceived source of social norms for 
college students, (b) to replicate and expand the social issues for which students show 
the false consensus effect, and (c) to demonstrate that this bias does relate to behavioral 
intentions. Previous research has shown that adolescents are strongly influenced by 
their peers' beliefs and behaviors (Laflin, Moore-Hirschl, Weis, & Hayes, 1994;
Wilks, Callan, & Austin, 1989). Furthermore, factor analyses based on predicting 
smokeless tobacco use among college athletes determined that family, peers, and 
advertising figures were the basis for subjective norms concerning this activity 
(Gottlieb, Gingiss, & Weinstein, 1992). Therefore, the first goal of this study was to 
establish the source of social norms for young adults in college. It was expected that
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students would be most influenced by close friends and significant others, followed by 
other students, parents and family members, and the media. To assess the source of 
norms, subjects were asked to rate the degree to which each group influences their 
beliefs about social issues. Additionally, they indicated which social groups influenced 
their thinking for each of the issues being examined.
Second, an attempt was made to replicate the findings from Study 1. Subjects 
were given an expanded list of social issues to determine if the effects are consistent 
across issues and people. The new issues tapped more current social concerns, including 
the legalization of homosexual marriage, pornography on the Internet, and homosexuals 
adopting children. Furthermore, the phrasing of the issues was modified to control for 
differential construal of the items. Gilovich (1990) found larger false consensus effects 
for items which allowed the greatest latitude for subjective interpretation. For 
example, he examined people’s preferences for American versus Italian food compared to 
fried chicken and veal parmigiana. In general, he found much larger effects for the non­
specific wording. Therefore, the differences in Study 2 were compared to Study 1 to 
assess the effects of word specificity on the FCE.
Finally, a behavioral measure was utilized to measure the influence of false 
consensus on behavioral intentions related to each issue. It was predicted that people 
who are in favor of a particular issue would be more likely to engage in related 
behaviors. Additionally, people who display the FCE should be more likely to engage in 
each behavior. Consequently, standard multiple regressions were run to determine the 
influence of false consensus as well as attitudes. This model mirrors Ajzen and 
Fishbein's theory of reasoned action in that attitudes and social norms were both entered 
into an equation to predict behavioral intentions.
This measure of norms is an estimate of the degree to which subjects fall prey to 
the false consensus bias. This measure was described in part by Krueger and Zeiger 
(1993) in their description of the “truly false consensus effect.” To determine if
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subjects were projecting beyond what would be expected, they calculated correlations 
between each subjects' position and the difference between actual and estimated 
consensus. This difference variable was used in the current study as a measure of the 
degree to which subjects display false consensus. Last, a measure of certainty regarding 
accuracy of perceptions was included as it has been shown to be predictive of behaviors 
by influencing people’s judgments of consensus (see Trafimow, 1994).
Individual Difference Variables
Several individual differences variables also have been shown to moderate the 
relation between attitudes and behavior. By including these variables in the study, it 
might be possible to get a clearer understanding of the impact of personality variables on 
people’s attitudes and behavioral intentions toward various social issues.
Mariowe-Crowne Social Desirability (SD). The Marlowe-Crowne scale (Crowne 
& Marlowe, 1960) measures the "need for approval" or the "avoidance of disapproval" 
when responding to questionnaires. A high score on this scale is indicative of the 
people’s tendency to respond in the conventional manner or to experimental demand 
characteristics. Because of the controversial nature of the issues selected for this 
research, it seemed important to assess the role of socially desirable responding. If 
people are basing their judgments on what they perceive as socially appropriate, these 
beliefs should also influence their behavioral likelihood scores. Therefore, it was 
predicted that higher social desirability scores would be predictive of behavioral 
intentions.
Self-monitoring (SM). In a meta-analysis conducted by Kraus (1995), he found 
that scores on self-monitoring significantly moderated the relation between attitudes and 
behavior, such that low self-monitors had stronger correlations between their attitudes 
and behavior (.50 versus .25 for low versus high self-monitors, respectively). This 
tendency has been supported by several studies, including research conducted by Prislin 
and Kovrlija (1 992), who showed that class attendance was more highly related to
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attitudes for low self-monitors than high self-monitors. Furthermore, subjective 
norms were more predictive of high self-monitors’ intentions to attend class.
Ajzen, Timko, and White (1982) qualified these findings. They surveyed 155 
undergraduates at three time periods during which they asked them questions relating to 
their voting and drug use behavioral intentions. Using this technique, they were able to 
get measures of intentions and actual behavior (i.e., did they smoke marijuana or vote 
for the candidate they supported). While they found that low self-monitors did have 
consistently higher correlations between their attitudes and behaviors than did high 
self-monitors, these differences were not predictive of behavioral intentions. Rather, 
the differences were observed in the reports of actual behavior; low self-monitors were 
more likely to have fulfilled their behavioral intentions. The authors reasoned that this 
finding was due to the situational pressures placed on high self-monitors which 
influenced their decision between the time they stated their intention and carried out the 
behavior (Ajzen, Timko, & White, 1982). Based on this research, it was predicted that 
the strength of the correlations between attitudes and behavior would be stronger for low 
self-monitors (see also DeBono & Snyder, 1995). Moreover, it was predicted that that 
low self-monitors’ behavioral intentions would be best predicted by their attitudes, 
while high self-monitors’ intentions would also be moderated by their false consensus 
scores and other personality variables.
Social Self-Esteem (SE). Previous research (Dielman, Campanelli, Shope & 
Butchart, 1987) has suggested that individuals with lower self-esteem are more likely 
to engage in peer-pressured behaviors, including drinking and drug use, while recent 
research claims that higher self-esteem is associated with these behaviors because of 
their role in impression management (Sharp & Getz, 1996). In an examination of 
alcohol and cigarette use among college students, Sharp and Getz demonstrated that people 
who were more likely to begin drinking scored higher in self-esteem and self­
monitoring. Therefore, it was hypothesized that higher scores in self-esteem would be
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more predictive of people’s likelihood to engage in behaviors related to each issue. 
However, because the researchers argued that this finding occurred because of 
impression management, only behaviors that are viewed as increasing social acceptance 
will be affected. In other words, behavior which is most influenced by peers should 
show the effect to the greatest extent.
Method
Subjects
Two hundred and three college students (49 males and 154 females) participated 
in this study in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. The participants ranged in 
age from 18 to 25 with an average age of 18.50 (SD = 1.95). The majority of students 
were freshmen (85%) who were Caucasian (95%) and Catholic (58%). Additionally, 
67 percent defined themselves as liberal, while 31 percent considered themselves 
conservative. Sixty six percent of the sample believed that they were “similar to their 
peers” while seventy eight percent of the students believed that “most college students 
try to be similar to their peers”.
Materials
False consensus. The questionnaire described in Study 1 was utilized with the 
addition of several topics, including adoption rights for homosexual couples, marriage 
between homosexual couples, and pornography on the Internet (see Appendices A and B). 
Furthermore, several items were reworded to make the issue more concrete and leave 
less room for interpretation (e.g., abortion was changed to “the right for a woman to 
choose an abortion”.) A behavioral questionnaire was also added to assess the likelihood 
that subjects will engage in acts related to each issue orr a 7-point Likert scale (see 
Appendix C). Then, a questionnaire which asked subjects to answer whether they would 
engage in each behavior and to estimate the frequency of these same behaviors for their 
peers was included (see Appendix D). An 11 -point rating scale (from -5 to +5, ranging
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from strongly disagree to strongly agree with 0 indicating a completely neutral 
position) was also utilized to rate the direction and strength of participants' attitudes 
(see Appendix E). Finally, a measure of certainty about subjects' estimates on each 
issue to measure their perceived accuracy was attached (see Appendix B).
Source of social norms. The second part of the questionnaire tapped the source of 
people's norms. Students assessed the degree to which they believed potential referents 
(e.g., parents, friends, religious figures, teachers) influenced personal judgments of 
social norms on a seven-point Likert scale (see Appendix F). This measure assessed the 
relative strength of influence of each of these groups. Additionally, a checklist format 
was utilized, so that for each topic, subjects checked all of the groups that influence 
their thinking on that item (see Appendix A).
Personality scales. The next part of the questionnaire consisted of several 
personality scales, including social desirability, self-monitoring, and social self­
esteem. The Mariowe-Crowne scale which measures the "need for approval" or the 
"avoidance of disapproval" when responding to questionnaires was used to tap social 
desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). The 33 item true/false scale consists of 
ordinary interpersonal and personal behaviors, which fall into two categories; 
desirable but uncommon behaviors and undesirable, but common behaviors. A high score 
on this scale is indicative of the subjects' tendency to respond in the conventional 
manner or to experimental demand characteristics. In the original sample (Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1960), a mean score of 15.5 (SD = 4.4) was obtained, however more recent 
examinations (Paulhus, 1984) revealed lower averages (e.g., R  = 13.3, SD = 4.3). 
Reliability values have been consistently strong, ranging from .73 to .88 (Paulhus, 
1991). Convergent and discriminant validity has been demonstrated with the use of 
correlates, such as responses to social reinforcement and social influence. Socially 
desirable responding was deemed crucial to consider because subjects may give
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responses that are influenced by demand characteristics of the experiment (see Appendix 
G).
Snyder’s (1974) original self-monitoring scale was utilized in this experiment. 
Self-monitoring measures the source of individuals' norms; internal factors or 
external sources. Snyder noticed that some individuals appear to be more concerned and 
skilled at adapting their personality and behavior to match their surroundings. He 
labeled this ability self-monitoring and devised a 25 point true/false scale to measure 
this individual difference variable. Individuals who receive high scores on this measure 
typically possess numerous social selves which change according to the situation. 
Basically, these individuals can be considered actors who are attuned to their 
surroundings and change their behaviors according. People who score on the low end of 
this scale behave in a more consistent manner which is representative of their true 
thoughts, feelings, and attitudes. These people value a single identity which is not 
compromised by the situation (see Appendix H).
The social self-esteem measure (Texas Social Behavior Inventory; Helmreich & 
Stapp, 1974) was employed to determine the influence of people's self-assurance in 
social situations on their likelihood to display false consensus. This 32-item scale was 
designed to be a measure of social competence with four sub-scales: confidence, 
dominance, social competence, and social withdrawal (see Appendix I). Subjects respond 
to items on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 0 “not at all characteristic of me” to 
4 “very characteristic of me.” It has been shown to have good internal consistency and 
validity (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991).
Demographics. The final section consisted of demographic information, including 
sex, age, class, number of months at the present university, religion, major, G.P.A., and 
SAT scores. The final two questions were designed to assess personal awareness of social 
influence. These items asked if students believe that they try to be similar or different
36
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
from their peers and if, in general, college students try to be similar or different than 
their peers (see Appendix J).
Procedure
Participants completed the questionnaire in groups of approximately thirty 
individuals in a classroom setting. All students answered the self ratings on the 
controversial issues scale first, followed by the peer estimates. The remainder of the 
information was presented in the order described in the materials section. After 
completing the packet, all subjects were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Completion of the questionnaire took approximately 45 minutes for most participants.
Results and Discussion 
This study was designed to accomplish three different goals: (a) to assess the 
perceived source of social norms for college students, (b) to replicate and expand the 
social issues for which students show the false consensus effect, and (c) to demonstrate 
that this bias relates to behavioral intentions.
Source of Social Norms
To test the first assumption that people derive their norms from observation of 
peers’ beliefs and behaviors (c.f., Laflin, Moore-Hirschl, Weis, & Hayes, 1994;
Norman & Tedeschi, 1989), the data concerning the source of social norms were 
examined. It was predicted that students would be most influenced by close friends and 
significant others, followed by other students, parents and family members, and the 
media. To examine this hypothesis, descriptive statistics were calculated using SPSS to 
determine which group was perceived as most influential by the subjects on a scale 
ranging from 1 ( “not at all influential”) to 7 (“very influential”). The results 
generally supported the hypothesis because participants perceived that their parents and 
close friends, followed by significant others, siblings, and teachers had the greatest 
impact on their beliefs. Other students, though, were perceived as having relatively 
little influence on the participants’ beliefs. Table 2 shows the means, standard
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deviations, and total number of subjects for each group in order of descending 
importance. Significant differences between the groups were calculated by conducting 
dependent means t-tests between the groups, controlling for Type 1 error by using the 
Bonferroni correction. Differences between the groups are indicated by the presence of 
different subscripts; groups with the same subscripts are not significantly different. 
All differences are significant at the j> < .005 level.
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Table 2
Perceived Influence of Various Social Groups on Social Norms









































Note. Different subscripts indicate significant differences between the groups at the 
g < .005 level.
Additionally, a principal components factor analysis using varimax rotation was 
run to establish if there were any underlying dimensions that represented the different 
social groups. Factors for which the eigenvalues were greater than one were retained. 
The results from this analysis indicated that there were three major factors; peers, 
media, and family/religious influence, supporting Gottlieb, Gingiss, and Weinstein’s 
(1992) findings. Table 3 summarizes the major findings from this factor analysis, 
including the factor loadings, eigenvalues, variance explained, and reliability 
coefficients.
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Table 3
Factor Analysis Assessing the Source of Social Norms
Factor
1 2  3
Peers Media Family/Religious figures
Group
Friends .80 .15 .15
Significant others .78 -.0 7 .13
Otherstudents .78 .18 .15
Teachers .56 .22 .13
Television .08 .93 - .0 0
Newspapers .21 .90 .06
Parents .16 -.0 4 .75
Religious figures -.0 3 .27 .67
Grandparents .31 -.0 6 .65
Siblings .46 -.1 0 .50
Eigenvalue 3.39 1.71 1.10
Percent variance 33.90 17.10 11.00
Reliability .76 .88 .63
Participants also completed a dichotomous scale in which they were asked to 
check all of the groups that had influenced the source of their beliefs for each issue. In 
order to calculate the perceived impact of these various social groups, two different 
measures were computed. First, the scores were coded as a dichotomous variable (0 = 
no; 1 = yes). Then, people’s answers were summed across each issue, divided by the 
total number of issues (N = 20) and multiplied by 100 in order to get a value which 
represents the relative frequency with which each group was cited. This measure gives 
an overall index of influence across issues out of a total one hundred percent. This 
information provided additional support for the influence of friends and parents; 
however, the media was the most frequently checked option. Interestingly, dating
40
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
partners or spouses were listed second to last, followed only by religious figures. The 
results of this analysis can be seen in Table 4.
Table 4
Relative Frequency of Social Influence across Issues

























Note. Different subscripts indicate significant differences between the groups at the 
J2 < .005 level.
N = 198.
The second index reports the three social groups which were checked most 
frequently by all subjects, providing a more sensitive measure of social norms for each 
topic. For example, regarding people’s attitudes toward abortion, friends were cited as 
influential by 54% of the participants, parents were listed 53% of the time, and the 
media was considered important by 37% of the sample. The most commonly cited groups 
(friends, parents, media) parallel the findings from the factor analysis.
It is logical to expect that different sources would differentially influence 
people’s thinking for various issues. For example, parents were rated most important 
for homosexual adoption, gays in military, seatbelt laws, and ban on public smoking. 
Friends were rated as most important concerning abortion, lowering the drinking age,
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and condom distribution in high schools. Surprisingly, the media was listed as most 
influential for the remaining twelve issues. The findings from that questionnaire are 
presented in Table 5.
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Table 5




Abortion Friends Parents Media
(53 .50%) (53.00%) (36.90%)
Euthanasia Media Parents Friends
(49.50%) (41.40%) (26.80%)
Death penalty Media Parents Friends
(53.00%) (43.40%) (26 .80%)
Medical Media Parents Friends
research (48.00%) (38.40%) (33 .80%)
Cosmetic Media Friends Parents
research (49.50%) (31.80%) (27.80%)
Homosexual Parents Friends Media
adoption (40.40%) (33.80%) (31.30%)
Legalization Media Friends Parents
of drugs (45.50%) (39.90%) (36.90%)
Pornography Media Parents Friends
(34.30%) (28.80%) (24.70%)
Insanity plea Media Parents Friends
(54.50%) (37.40%) (18 .70%)
Gays in military Parents Media Friends
(41.40%) (38.40%) (32.30%)
Drinking age Friends Parents Media
(49 .50%) (35.40%) (30.30%)
Foreign aid Media Parents Friends
(53.50%) (45.50%) (13.10%)
Seatbelt laws Parents Media Friends
(66.20%) (41.90%) (38.90%)
Gun sales Media Parents Friends
(56.60%) (54.00%) (27.80%)





in combat (40 .40% )
Condom Friends
distribution (54 .50% )
Affirmative Media
action (41 .40% )
Homosexual Media
marriage (32 .80% )
Prayer Parents
in schools (40 .90% )
Friends Media
(42.40%) (32 .80% )
Parents Friends
(39.90%) (38 .40% )
Media Parents
(44.40%) (36 .90% )
Parents Friends
(34.80%) (22 .20% )
Parents Friends
(31.80%) (22 .20% )
Media Friends
(37.40%) (29 .30% )
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The findings from the social norms questionnaires generally supported the 
hypothesis that people derive their beliefs concerning controversial social issues from 
parents, peers, and the media. It is important to acknowledge that these results reflect 
the subjects’ perceptions, rather than any direct measure of influence. However, 
research suggests that perceptions, rather than reality, often guide adolescents’ 
decisions. For example, Wilks, Callan, and Austin (1989) showed that perceptions of 
peers’ alcohol usage were generally more predictive of drinking behaviors than 
assessments of parents’ actual drinking habits. Additionally, Cummings and Corney 
(1987) noted that people’s normative beliefs do not have to accurately reflect 
referents’ beliefs to be significant predictors of behavioral intentions in regard to 
gambling behavior. Therefore, the influence of perceptions should not be 
underestimated.
In most cases, the information from the three measures provided confirmation
regarding the importance of the various social groups. Parents and friends consistently
were perceived as the most important groups in determining the students’ beliefs.
However, the media was emphasized only when people were asked to consider the source
of influence for each issue. Therefore, it appears that individuals do not generally
believe the media, including newspapers and television, affects their thinking, but they
must have received some amount of information from these sources, which is triggered
when they see the topics presented. This finding may be explained in terms of the
availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973); people are not consciously aware
«
of the influence of the media until they read the issues which brings current references 
to mind, namely the television and newspapers.
One conflicting finding was that significant others, including dating partners and 
spouses, were rated highly on the general measure which asked people to assess the 
impact of various groups on the development of their personal beliefs (see Table 2), but 
they were ranked second to last based on the measure of relative influence across issues
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(see Table 4). This finding might be an artifact of the question wording because the first 
measure asks people very generally to rate the impact of dating partners or spouses on 
their personal beliefs, while the second questionnaire asked them to assess the influence 
of these groups on their beliefs for a specific topic. Since no information was collected 
regarding the dating or marital status of the participants in the research, it is 
reasonable to assume that many of the subjects who were first semester freshmen did 
not currently have a dating partner who would exert any influence about these topical 
issues. However, the more general question might be tapping into influence exerted by 
previous partners or reflecting participants’ beliefs about how someone in this role 
might sway personal beliefs in the future.
Finally, the factor analysis provided compelling evidence that the sources of 
influence could be divided into three main groups; peers, family, and the media (see 
Table 3). These groupings are then reflected in the responses students gave to the 
checklist questionnaire as these groups (friends, parents, media) were consistently 
listed as the three most influential sources (see Table 5). This knowledge could be very 
helpful in establishing which groups could be effective in changing normative standards 
for behavior. Programs directed at high-risk homosexual behavior have been effective 
by training high status leaders in the group to endorse safer sexual practices (Kelly et 
al., 1991, 1992). Based on the sources of social norms for these issues, campaigns 
should be directed at the most influential groups, including the presentation of these 
issues in the media.
Replication and Extension of False Consensus Effect
The second goal of this study was to replicate and extend the findings from Study 
1. It was hypothesized that subjects would display a false consensus effect, in which 
people who support a particular position estimate that a greater number of their peers 
also support this position relative to individuals who are opposed. To test this 
prediction, t-tests were conducted on the consensus estimates between individuals who
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support and people who oppose each position. Descriptive statistics were obtained for 
each issue using SPSS. The means and standard deviations for ratings on each issue are 
presented in Table 6, as well as the t  and p values. Last, the actual number of subjects 
who endorse each position is listed in brackets in the table. A Bonferroni correction was 
used to control for Type 1 error due to the large number of comparisons being made. 
Eighteen of the twenty issues displayed the false consensus at the p < .05 level. With the 
Bonferroni correction, sixteen of the twenty issues supported the false consensus 
hypothesis.
This analysis is a replication of the tests conducted in Study 1 with the addition of 
several items (i.e., “animal research for cosmetics” (item 5), “the right for 
homosexual couples to adopt children” (item 5), “pornography on the Internet” (item 
8), and “the right for homosexuals to legally marry” (item 19)). Furthermore, some 
of the items were reworded in order to make the statements less ambiguous. For 
example “abortion” was modified to read “the right for a woman to choose an abortion" 
(see Appendix A for a complete list of modified items). Overall, the effect did replicate 
with a few exceptions; Study 2, unlike Study 1, found a significant false consensus effect 
for ban on gun sales and racial quotas for employment.
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Table 6
T-Test Analyses to Measure False Consensus Comparing Consensus Estimates Between 





Mean (SD) TNI t p
Abortion 67 .4 1 (1 6 .17)[171] 62.67(13.24)[30] 1.52 .131
Euthanasia 54 .32 (16 .6 0 ) [1 34] 34.85(18.37)[65] 7.49 .0 0 0 * *
Death penalty 58.61 ( 1 8 .38 ) [153] 52.50(16.58)[44] 1.99 .0 48*
Medical research 59 .89 (19 .58 ) [1 37] 43.52(24.47)[63] 4.67 .0 0 0 * *
Cosmetic research 48 .1 8 (2 3 .16)[11] 25.04(22.4 2 ) [1 89] 3.32 .0 0 1 * *
Homosexual
adoption
49.64(1 9 .5 4 ) [1 20] 38.51 (20.51 )[79] 3.86 .0 0 0 * *
Drugs legalized 73.41 (18 .44) [85] 58.41 (20.9 3 ) [1 14] 5.26 .0 0 0 * *
Pornography 
on the Internet
68 .11 (19 .92)[72] 43.09(24.0 6 ) [1 27] 7.49 .0 0 0 * *
Insanity plea 58.62(1 7.63)[81 ] 43.63(18.6 4 ) [1 1 8] 5.70 .0 0 0 * *
Gays in the military53.86(20.19)[171 ] 44.36(20.41 )[28] 2.24 .026*
Lower drinking age85.30(1 5 .64) [124] 72.97(18.22)[76] 5.08 .0 0 0 * *
Foreign aid 55 .32 (16 .74)[109] 44.1 7(1 6.75)[87] 4.63 .0 0 0 * *
Mandatory 
seatbelt laws
64.86 (22 .43)[1 59] 35.76(18.67)[42] 7.72 .0 0 0 * *
Ban on gun sales 61.60(1 8.49) [1 68] 48.62(19.80)[32] 3.60 .0 0 0 * *
Ban on public 
smoking
43 .72 (21 .6 5 ) [1 10] 33.53(21.82)[90] 3.34 .0 0 1 * *
Women in combat 65 .27 (18 .36)[179] 47.27(1 9.44)[22] 4.31 .0 0 0 * *
Condom 8 1 .6 9 (1 6.89)[164]  
distribution in schools
61.68(20.17) [34] 6.07 .0 0 0 * *
Racial quotas 
for employment
56 .84 (22 .62)[62] 41.27(20.1 7) [ 129] 4.80 .0 0 0 * *
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Table 6 (cont)
Homosexual 44.81 (19 .62) [145] 39.17(27.44)[53]  1.37
marriage
Prayer in 44 .17(18 .57 ) [12] 22 .50 (17 .45)[181 ] 4.15
public schools_____________________________________________________
* B < .05.
** Significant with Bonferroni correction (b<-0025).
.173
. 0 0 0 * *
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A similar analysis was conducted on the behavioral items to determine if there 
was a false consensus effect for people who would engage in a given behavior relative to 
individuals who would not engage in each behavior. Items were worded so that they would 
be relevant to all groups, for example, the behavioral item relating to women’s right to 
have an abortion was “Would you go with a friend who was having an abortion?” 
Therefore, males and females could both answer this question. For a complete list of the 
behavioral items, see Appendix C. It was also necessary to recode four of the items 
(“gays in the military” (item 10), “mandatory seatbelt law” (item 13), “women in 
combat” (item 16) and “prayer in public schools” (item 20)) so that the statements 
were all worded in the same direction and there was a positive correlation between the 
attitude and behavior questions. In order to demonstrate the false consensus effect, t- 
tests were then conducted on the average estimates of these groups. The means and 
standard deviations for ratings on each issue are shown in Table 7, as well as the tand p 
values for each issue. The total number of people who actually support each position is 
also listed in brackets in the table. Last, a Bonferroni correction was used to control for 
Type 1 error due to the large number of comparisons being made.
Overall, fourteen of the twenty issues displayed the false consensus effect. Using 
the more stringent alpha level reduced the number of significant differences to thirteen 
of the twenty issues. Surprisingly, the issues for which the effect was not found using 
the behavioral indices were different from the issues when the attitudinal variable was 
analyzed (compare Tables 6 and 7).
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Table 7
T-Test Analyses to Measure False Consensus Comparing Consensus Estimates Between 





Mean (SD) TNI t p
Abortion 69.82(1 5 .67)[174] 55.00(1 6 .72)[28] 4.60 .0 0 0 * *
Euthanasia 52.58(18 .88)[66] 29.21 (2 2 .0 4 ) [1 29] 7.34 .0 0 0 * *
Death penalty 65.84(1 7 .9 5 ) [1 55] 53.1 9(1 8 .19)  [47] 4.22 .0 0 0 * *
Medical research 60.73(1 9 .22 ) [129] 38.49(1 9.94)[72] 7.76 .0 0 0 * *
Cosmetic research 61.55(20.95 ) [53 ] 40.93(26.0 7 ) [1 49] 5.19 .0 0 0 * *
Homosexual
adoption
36.52(1 5.96)[85] 34.84(23 .7 4 ) [1 1 6] .60 .551
Drugs legalized 79.02(14 .8 6 ) [1 21] 70 .27(20 .67) [82] 3.30 .0 0 1 * *
Pornography 
on the Internet
51.45(19 .11)[20] 33.20(24.40)[1 82] 3.23 .0 0 1 * *
Insanity plea 55.35(1 7 .07)[86] 45.52(1 7.5 5) [ 113] 3.96 .0 0 0 * *
Gays in the military56.61 (17 .4 0 ) [1 73] 52.20(17 .98)[25] 1.18 .240
Lower drinking age80.32(12.08)[156] 64.47(21 .05)[47] 4.92 .0 0 0 * *
Foreign aid 49.19(16 .70)[62] 44.59(20.87)  [133] 1.52 .130
Mandatory 
seatbelt laws
48.51(19.80 ) [133] 29.77(1 8 .77) [70] 6.53 .0 0 0 * *
Ban on gun sales 56.04(1 7.95) [1 53] 51.11 (20 .69) [45] 1.56 .120
Ban on
public smoking
37.49(1 8 .75)[63] 31.86(22.69 ) [138] 1.72 .087
Women in combat 65.68(20.18 ) [1 67] 42 .71(15 .90)[35] 6.33 .0 0 0 * *
Condom 75.64(16.6 8 ) [ 1 54] 
distribution in schools
50.35(20.94)[43] 8.29 .0 0 0 * *
Racial quotas 57.61 (20 .80 ) [54 ] 45 .90(21 .52)[140] 3.43 .0 0 1 * *
for employment
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Table 7 (cont.)
Homosexual 49 .20 (19 .23) [134] 40 .3 7 (2 6 .33)[67]  2.44
marriage
Prayer in 63.71 (20 .24) [131 ] 49.31 (22.74)[65]  4.50
public schools_____________________________________________________
*  e < .0 5
**  Significant with Bonferroni correction (jd<.0025).
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. 0 1 6 *
. 0 0 0 * *
The first analysis was conducted to replicate the findings from Study 1. The 
findings did replicate with a few exceptions, which could be due, in part, to the larger 
sample size which increases the power of the statistical tests. The revised wording, 
though, did not appear to affect the results of the test as the items which underwent the 
most change, including abortion (item 1), drug legalization (item 7), and prayer in 
school (item 20), still displayed a significant effect. Consequently, it can be concluded 
that the false consensus effect is very robust and relatively immune to minor 
alternations in wording or order of presentation.
The second analysis establishes the false consensus effect for behavioral 
endorsements and estimates. Instead of asking people to state their attitude and their 
estimates of how many people are in favor of a particular belief, subjects were asked if 
they would engage in a behavior and then asked to estimate how many of their peers 
would also engage in this behavior. In general, fewer issues displayed a significant FCE 
for the behavioral assessment, which could be due to the fact that behaviors can be 
observed, while attitudes have to be inferred. This discrepancy may enable people to 
make more accurate judgments regarding observable behavior, thus eliminating the 
effect One of the original tests supporting the false consensus effect did involve 
behavioral intentions and behavior (e.g., asking people if they would be willing to wear a 
sandwich board), but this action is not a commonly observed or discussed likelihood 
(Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). Perhaps the controversial and topical nature of the 
issues selected for this research give people ample opportunity to observe or intuit 
correct information regarding their peers’ actions. However, underlying attitudes are 
still difficult to interpret, which leads to the false consensus effect for the attitudinal 
measure.
False Consensus and Behavioral Intentions
To test the final hypothesis that the false consensus bias would predict behavioral 
intentions, a series of standard multiple regression analysis were run. In each case, the
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behavioral likelihood score served as the dependent measure, while participants’ 
attitudes, degree of false consensus, certainty, and scores on the three personality 
variables (self-monitoring, social self-esteem, and social desirability) were used as 
predictor variables. It was hypothesized that people’s attitudes would be the best 
predictor of their intentions to engage in each behavior; however it was also expected 
that the degree of false consensus would explain additional variance. Furthermore, 
certainty has been shown to influence the effects of subjective norms, so this variable 
was entered into the regression equation. It was hypothesized that higher certainty 
scores would be predictive of people’s self-reported likelihood of behavior. Last, the 
personality variables were included to see if there are any individual differences in 
people’s likelihood to participate in each act. People with high social self-esteem should 
be more likely to engage in peer-influenced behavior, while people who are low in social 
desirability or self-monitoring were predicted to be less likely to engage in this type of 
behavior.
Testing the statistical assumptions. Basic tests concerning the assumptions 
underlying the regression analyses were conducted. All of the variables appeared to meet 
the criteria concerning normality, linearity, multicollinearity, and homoscedasticity, 
so no transformations were conducted. The three standard personality measures 
employed in this research were also assessed. Scores on the Mariowe-Crowne social 
desirability scale were found to be normally distributed with a mean of 13.46 (SD =
5.14) out of a possible 33 items. The average score on the self-monitoring scale was 
12.09 (SD = 4.06) out of a total 25 items. Last, subjects had an average score of 2.52 
( SD = .51) on the self-esteem scale which ranged from 0 to 4 (higher scores indicating 
greater levels of self-esteem). Cronbach’s alpha coefficients were also calculated for 
each scale to determine the reliability of the measures. Social desirability had a 
standardized alpha of .77, self-monitoring had a value of .68, and self-esteem had a
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reliability coefficient of .90. These scores suggest that the scales are highly internally 
consistent and reliable.
Calculating false consensus scores. Participants’ false consensus scores were 
calculated in a number of different ways. Based on Krueger and Zeiger’s (1993) truly 
false consensus measure, a score was computed for each individual which assessed 
his/her overall tendency to overestimate support for his/her position. In order to 
calculate this score, within-subject analyses were conducted which correlated each 
subjects’ endorsement with the difference between actual consensus and his/her 
estimate (r_(endorsement, actual consensus minus consensus estimate)) across twelve 
issues. The endorsement variable was coded as 0 (against) and 1 (for), such that 
positive correlations suggest that people who are in favor of each issue are 
overestimating support or people who are against each issue are underestimating 
support. On the other hand, negative correlations indicate that people are not 
demonstrating the false consensus bias because their consensus estimates are unrelated 
to their personal position. Eight issues were eliminated to control for a potential ceiling 
effect; topics for which people estimated that more than 80% or less than 20% of their 
peers were in support were removed from the analysis, which resulted in dropping; 
“abortion" “death penalty” “cosmetic research” “gays in the military” “ban on 
automatic gun sales” “women in combat” “free condom distribution in high schools” and 
“enforced prayer in public schools”. High positive correlations indicate an overall 
tendency for individuals to fall prey to the false consensus effect. Because there was a 
wide range of scores (-.76 to .77), the mean truly false consensus effect (TFCE) was 
.05 (SD = .31), which suggests that people do not consistently display the effect across 
social issues.
A similar measure was computed based on people’s behavioral endorsements and 
estimates, rather than their attitudes. In order to be comparable, the analyses were 
conducted on the same twelve issues. Using this technique, the overall behavioral truly
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false consensus effect (BTFCE) was .12 (SD = .36) with a range of -.61 to .77, 
supporting the assertion that people do not demonstrate the effect across issues. 
Interestingly, these two measures of false consensus were only weakly, albeit 
significantly, correlated (r(202)=.21, p < .01.
Last, false consensus scores were computed for each issue by subtracting the 
actual consensus from each person’s estimate to determine the extent to which each 
subject overestimated support for their position using the behavioral measure. Higher 
difference scores were indicative of people’s tendency to demonstrate the false consensus 
bias. Signed values were used as it is necessary to know if a particular subject 
demonstrates the effect to a greater or lesser degree. Positive scores indicate people who 
are overestimating support, while negative scores suggest that students were 
underestimating actual consensus.
Regression analyses using truly false consensus as a predictor variable. These 
variables were entered separately into the standard multiple regression analyses to 
predict behavioral intentions. In general, the TFCE and BTFCE scores were not shown to 
be predictive of people’s behavioral intentions. People’s TFCE scores, which represents 
their general tendency to overestimate support for their position, were only predictive 
for one issue; lowering the drinking age. The scores based on the behavioral 
endorsements and estimates (BTFCE) were only slightly better predictors, as this 
variable was a significant predictor for four (legalization of drugs, lowering the 
drinking age, affirmative action, and homosexual marriage) of the twenty issues.
Analysis of variance using truly false consensus scores as an independent 
variable. Since both variables (attitudinal and behavioral TFCE) appeared to be poor 
predictors of behavioral intentions, a median split was utilized to divide people into 
groups on the basis of their FCE scores; only the top and bottom 25% of subjects were 
used (scores below -.17 and above .29 for TFCE and -.20 and .40 for BTFCE). To
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determine if there were any effects of these variables, a two-way ANOVA was conducted 
using position and FCE as the independent variables and behavioral likelihood scores as 
the dependent variable. Even using these extreme groups, degree of false consensus 
failed to consistently explain differences in people’s behavioral tendencies. Therefore, 
it was concluded that it is not possible to conceive of false consensus as a general 
tendency across a range of social issues. Subsequently, the individual measure of false 
consensus was entered in all of the remaining analyses.
Factor analysis to establish underlying dimensions for the social issues. A 
principal components factor analysis using varimax rotation was conducted on the 
dependent measures (i.e., behavioral likelihood scores) to determine if there were 
patterns of similarity across the issues. The factor analysis failed to converge after 24 
iterations, so the unrotated factors were analyzed. While factors emerged, they were 
difficult to interpret. Furthermore, similar patterns failed to emerge when the 
predictor variables (i.e., attitudes, certainty, and degree of FCE measure) were factor 
analyzed. When reliability coefficients were calculated based on the scales produced by 
the original factor analysis on the dependent variable, the alpha coefficients were 
unsatisfactory; in fact, many of them were negative.
Regression analyses using the individual measure of false consensus as a 
predictor. These results suggest that there is not a common dimension underlying these 
issues. Consequently, the remaining analyses were conducted on individual issues.
While multiple regression analyses were conducted on all twenty issues, five issues 
were selected a priori on the basis of the source of social norms to discuss in more 
detail. Issues for which friends or peers had the strongest effect on the norms for 
behavior were selected based on Table 5, including “the right for a woman to choose an 
abortion (1)”, “legalization and government regulation of drugs (7)”, “lower the 
drinking age to 18 (11)”, “free condom distribution in high schools (17)”, and “ban 
on public smoking (15)”.
57
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
For the remaining analyses, standard multiple regression analyses were 
conducted using SPSS. In each case, the behavioral likelihood score served as the 
dependent measure, while participants’ attitudes, degree of false consensus for each 
issue, certainty, and scores on the three personality variables (self-monitoring, social 
self-esteem, and social desirability) were used as predictor variables.
Tables 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16 display the correlations, means, and standard 
deviations for all of the variables (i.e., behavioral likelihood scores, attitudes, degree of 
false consensus, certainty, self-monitoring, self-esteem, and social desirability) 
involved in the regressions for “abortion”, “lower the drinking age to 18”, 
“legalization and government regulation of drugs”, “ban on public smoking”, and “free 
condom distribution in high schools”, respectively. In order to facilitate interpretation 
of the tables, the range of scores for each scale will be reported below. The behavioral 
likelihood scores have a range of 1 (“very unlikely”) to 7 (“very likely”). The 
attitude scale was assessed using a Likert scale ranging from -5 (“strongly disagree”) 
to +5 (“strongly agree”). Certainty scores were recorded on a scale from 1 (“very 
uncertain”) to 5 (“very certain”). Self-monitoring scores are reported as a sum of 25 
total items, while social desirability represents a sum of 33 total items. Last, self­
esteem is presented as the mean score on a scale from 0 “not at all characteristics of 
me” to 4 “very characteristic of me"; higher scores indicate higher self-confidence.
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Table 8
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviation for “Abortion"
Attitude FCE Cert SD SM SE Mean SD
Behavior .6 4 * * .4 0 * * .07 - .18 - . 1 2  - .02 5.58 1.91
Attitude .09 .00 - . 1 2 - . 0 2 .06 3.03 3.04
FCE .17* -.05 .05 .03 -18.28 16.56
Certainty - .06 .06 .12 3.25 .96
SD - . 4 0 * * .14* 13.46 5.14
SM 2 4 * * 12.09 4.06
SE 2.51 .51
Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty; SD = social desirability; 
SM = self-monitoring; SE = social self-esteem.
* f i< .0 5 .  **£<.01.
N=203.
Tables 9, 11, 13, 15, and 17 display the results of the regression analyses for 
the same five topics, including the unstandardized regression coefficients (B) and 
intercept, the standardized regression coefficients (Beta), the semipartial correlations
( si^), JL R^, and the adjusted r2.
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Table 9
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Likelihood “To Go With A Friend Who Was 
Havina an Abortion" from Attitude. Degree of False Consensus (FCE). Certainty. Social 
Desirability (SD). Self-Monitoring (SM). and Self-Esteem (SE)
Predictor variables B Beta sr2 t
Attitude .36 .58 .31 1 1 .6 8 **
FCE .04 .34 .11 6 .8 8 * *
Certainty .00 .00 .00 - .0 0
SD - .06 - .16 .02 - 2 . 7 8 * *
SM - .06 - .13 .01 - 2 . 3 3 * *
SE .19 .05 .00 .98
Constant 6.25 9 .3 4 * *
R2 = .54
R2 (adjusted) = .53 
R = .74**
* e  < .05. * * f i<.01.
The R value for the regression concerning “the right for a woman to choose an 
abortion” was significantly different from 0, F(6,196) = 38.40, g <  .001.
Additionally, four of the predictor variables were found to be significantly related to 
people’s likelihood to “go with a friend who was having an abortion.” Attitude toward
abortion (sr2 = .31), degree of false consensus (s i2 = .11), scores on social 
desirability (sr2 = .02) and self-monitoring (sr2 = .01) were all found to be 
significant predictors of behavioral intentions. All six predictors variables combined 
explained 54% (53% adjusted) of the variability in the decision to go with a friend who 
was having an abortion (see Table 9).
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Table 10
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Legalization of Drugs"
Attitude FCE Cert SD SM SE Mean SD
Behavior . 5 5 * *  . 3 0 * * .1 7 *  - . 1 7 * .12 .06 4.17 2.56
Attitude .1 5* .26 - .00 .10 .18* - .20 3.43
FCE .2 8**- .  12 .02 .04 15.49 17.92
Certainty -.12 .14* . 2 5 * * 3.37 1.03
SD - . 4 0 * * .15* 13.46 5.14
SM .24* 12.09 4.06
SE 2.51 .51
Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty; SD = social desirability; 
SM = self-monitoring; SE = social self-esteem.
*E < .05. * *e<  .01.
N=203.
Table 11
Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Likelihood to “Smoke Marijuana” from 
Attitude. Degree of False Consensus (FCE). Certainty. Social Desirability (SD). Self- 
Monitoring (SM). and Self-Esteem (SE)
Predictor variables B Beta sr2 t
Attitude .40 .54 .26 9.01
FCE .03 .23 .05 3.80
Certainty -.11 - .0 4 .00 -.72
SD -.06 - .13 .01 -1 .98 '
SM .02 .03 .00 .46
SE -.17 - .03 .00 - .53
Constant 5.15 5.19
R2 = .38
R2 (adjusted) = .36 
R = .62**
* £ <  .05. **g < .01.
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The R value was significantly different from 0 for “legalization and government 
regulation of drugs”, F(6,192) = 19.63, g < .001. Additionally, three of the predictor 
variables were found to be significantly related to people’s likelihood to “smoke 
marijuana.” Attitude toward the legalization of drugs (s i2 = .26), degree of false 
consensus (sr2 = .05), and scores on social desirability (sr2 = .01) were all found to 
be significant predictors of behavioral intentions. All six predictors variables combined 
explained 38% (36% adjusted) of the variability in the decision to smoke marijuana 
(see Table 11).
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Table 12
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviation for “Lowering the Drinking Age to 18”
Attitude FCE Cert SD SM SE Mean SD
Behavior . 5 6 * * 4 0 * * .07 - . 2 0 * * .15* .17* 4.87 1.89
Attitude .2 7 * * .2 0 **- .12 .07 .15* 1.00 3.64
FCE .1 8 * * - .10 .06 .13 - .34 16.05
Certainty - .10 .1 9 * * .2 6 * * 3.78 1.08
SD - . 4 0 * * .15* 13.46 5.14
SM .2 4 * * 12.09 4.06
SE 2.51 .51
Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty; SD = social desirability; 
SM = self-monitoring; SE = social self-esteem.
*B <  .05. **f i<.01.
N=203.
Table 13
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Likelihood “To Buv a Beer for an Underaaed 
Friend” from Attitude. Degree of False Consensus (FCE). Certainty. Social Desirability 
(SD). Self-Monitorina (SM). and Self-Esteem (SE)
Predictor variables B Beta sr2 t
Attitude .24 .48 .20 8.12
FCE .03 .27 .06 4.62
Certainty - .2 2 - .12 .01 -2 .1 4
SD - .0 4 -.12 .01 -1.81
SM .02 .06 .00 .86
SE .37 .10 .01 1.62
Constant 4.79 6.93
R2 = .41
R2 (adjusted) = .40 
R = .64**
* f i<  .05. **f i<.01.
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TheR. value for “lowering the drinking age to 18” was significantly different 
from 0, E(6,l 93) = 22.71, p < .001. Additionally, three of the predictor variables 
were found to be significantly related to people’s likelihood “to buy a beer for an 
underaged friend.” Attitude toward lowering the drinking age (sr2 = .20), degree of
false consensus (sr2 = .06), and certainty scores (sr2 = .01) were all found to be 
significant predictors of behavioral intentions. All six predictors variables combined 
explained 41 % (40% adjusted) of the variability in the decision to buy a beer for an 
underaged friend (see Table 13).
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Table 14
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for *Ban on Public Smoking’
Attitude FCE Cert SD SM SE Mean SD
Behavior . 6 1 * * . 0 4  .03 .12 - .0 7  - .0 6  3.64 2.18
Attitude -.01 - .0 3  .11 - .0 8  - . 1 0  .46 3.66
FCE - . 1 4 *  .13 - .0 5  - .0 6  2.58 21.60
Certainty -.11 .13 .09 3.14 1.08
SD - . 4 0 * * . 1 5 *  13.46 5.14
SM . 2 4 * *  12.09 4.06
SE 2.51 .51
Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty; SD = social desirability; 
SM = self-monitoring; SE = social self-esteem.
*E  < .05. * *g<.01.
N=203.
Table 15
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Likelihood “To Go Only to Non-Smoking 
Restaurants and Bars” from Attitude. Degree Of False Consensus (FCE). Certainty. 
Social Desirability (SD). Self-Monitoring (SM). and Self-Esteem (SE)
Predictor variables B Beta sr2 t
Attitude .36 .60 .35 10 .38**
FCE .00 .05 .00 .86
Certainty .11 .06 .00 .95
SD .02 .06 .00 .87
SM .00 .00 .00 .000
SE -.04 -.01 .00 - .14
Constant 2.87 3 .4 6 **
R2 = .37
R2 (adjusted) = .35 
R = .61**
*f i  < .05. * *£ <  .01.
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The R. value for the regression analysis for the “ban on public smoking” issue 
was significantly different from 0, F(6,192) = 19.12, e < .001. However, only 
attitude (sr2 = .35) was found to be significantly related to people’s likelihood to “go 
only to non-smoking restaurants and bars.” All six predictor variables combined 
explained 37% (35% adjusted) of the variability in the decision to go only to non­
smoking establishments (see Table 15).
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Table 16
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Free Condom Distribution in High 
Schools”
Attitude FCE Cert SD SM SE Mean SD
Behavior .8 1 * *  . 6 0 * *  .42 * * - .1  7 *  .04 .20* * 5.29 2.01
Attitude .4 6 * *  . 4 0 * * - . 2 5 * * . 1 2 .11 2.96 2.86
FCE .4 0 * * - . 1 3  .06 .14 - 7 .0 8  20.49
Certainty - . 1 9 * *  .13 .10 3.64 1.09
SD - . 4 0 * * .14* 13.46 5.14
SM .24** 12.09 4.06
SE 2.51 .51
Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty; SD = social desirability; 
SM = self-monitoring; SE = social self-esteem.
*l> < .05. **b < .01.
N=203.
Table 17
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Likelihood “Distribute Free Condoms to High 
School Seniors” from Attitude. Degree of False Consensus (FCE). Certainty. Social 
Desirability (SD). Self-Monitoring (SM). and Self-Esteem (SE)
Predictor variables B Beta sr2 t
Attitude .47 .67 .31 1 5 .0 5 * *
FCE .02 .26 .05 6 .0 0 * *
Certainty .08 .04 .00 1.06
SD - .0 0 -.01 .00 - .3 3
SM - .0 4 - .0 8 .00 - 1 .86
SE .40 .10 .01 2 .5 2 *
Constant 3.36 6 .2 2 * *
R2 = .74
R2 (adjusted) = .73 
R = .86**
*B < .05. **g< .01.
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The R. value for “free condom distribution in high schools” was significantly 
different from 0, F(6,191) = 88.65, fi < .001. Additionally, three of the predictor 
variables were found to be significantly related to people’s likelihood to “distribute free 
condoms to high school seniors.” Attitude toward free condom distribution (sr2 = .31), 
degree of false consensus (sr2 = .05), and self-esteem scores (sr2 = .01) were all 
found to be significant predictors of behavioral intentions. All six predictor variables 
combined explained 74% (73% adjusted) of the variability in the decision to distribute 
free condoms to high school seniors (see Table 17).
Summary. Overall, based on the five selected issues, students’ own attitudes 
were a significant predictor for each dependent variable, while degree of false consensus 
was significant for four out of five analyses. The certainty variable and individual 
difference scores were inconsistent in their ability to predict behavioral intentions. The 
only issue for which false consensus was not a significant predictor was “ban on public 
smoking” which is logical because there was not a FCE for this issue. If people are not 
demonstrating the bias, it follows that it would not be differentially predictive of their 
likelihood to engage in behaviors related to the topic. The remaining four topics did show 
the FCE effect, which was subsequently predictive of participants’ behavioral intentions.
Another important observation from the results is that people’s attitudes were 
only weakly (if at all) related to their degree of false consensus. For “the right for a 
woman to choose an abortion” and “ban on public smoking”, attitudes and degree of false 
consensus were not correlated, while for “lowering the drinking age to l 8”,
“legalization and government regulation of drugs”, and “free condom distribution in 
high schools”, they were weakly correlated. In all cases, the strength of the correlation 
was considerably lower than the correlations between attitudes and behavior and degree 
of false consensus and behavior. This finding indicates that people’s estimates of false 
consensus are not strongly related to their attitudes, which implies that a significant
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predictor of their behavioral intentions (i.e., degree of false consensus) is unrelated to 
their personal beliefs. This finding could be explained in terms of the evaluation 
principle proposed by Sherman, Chassin, Presson, and Agostinelii (1984) because 
attitudes are only indirectly related to people’s false consensus estimates. This 
observation lends support to the prediction that peers’ beliefs are important 
determinants of behavior, regardless of personal convictions. Therefore, correcting 
misperceptions of these beliefs might help to alleviate several social problems present 
on college campuses.
Furthermore, certainty was related to degree of false consensus for all five 
issues, which shows that more confident people are more likely to display false 
consensus (with the exception of “ban on public smoking” which was negatively 
correlated). However, certainty was not predictive of the likelihood to engage in the 
behaviors, which might be a function of the wording of the questions. Participants were 
asked to rate the certainty of their estimates, which could explain why more confident 
individuals showed the false consensus effect to a greater degree. The strong relation 
between these variables may have prevented certainty from being an independent 
predictor.
Based on the analyses of all twenty issues, attitudes were a significant predictor 
in all of the regressions, while false consensus was a significant predictor for thirteen 
of the total issues. As suggested by the data already reviewed, the remaining variables 
were not generally good predictors of behavioral intentions; certainty and self­
monitoring scores were predictive for 3 of 20 issues, while social desirability and self­
esteem scores were predictive for only 2 of 20 issues. Because of their failure to 
replicate across social issues, these variables cannot be considered reliable factors in 
people’s likelihood to engage in different behavior.
As predicted by the theory of reasoned action, attitudes were the best predictors 
of behavioral intentions across all of the issues. However, degree of false consensus was
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also a significant predictor for many of the issues, suggesting that people are basing 
their behavioral intentions on their largely inaccurate perceptions of their peers’ 
beliefs. The effect was particularly strong for issues such as “legalization and 
government regulation of drugs” and “lowering the drinking age to 18” which have 
important ramifications for college students. If students incorrectly believe that a large 
percentage of their peers are buying beer for underaged friends or smoking marijuana 
and these perceptions are guiding their own behavioral intentions related to these 
activities, problems could (and do) ensue. Previous research has shown that people who 
overestimate the percentage of individuals who smoke are more likely to smoke 
themselves or begin smoking (Botvin, Botvin, Baker, Dusenbury, & Goldberg, 1992; 
Chassin, Presson, Sherman, Corty, & Olshavsky, 1984). Other research has 
determined that behavioral intentions are reasonably good predictors of actual behaviors 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; van den Putte, 1991). Therefore, it is reasonable to 
conclude that people’s erroneous perceptions may be influencing their decision to engage 
in harmful behavior.
Analyses using scales based on the source of social norms. While it is possible to 
notice trends in the data, it is difficult to draw conclusions based on the individual 
regression analyses. However, the factor analysis failed to generate any consistent 
factors, so it was problematic to divide the social issues into scales. Analyzing the data 
based on the primary source of the social norms provided some interesting and reliable 
results. To accomplish this goal, the five items which were selected as most influenced 
by peers were subjected to a reliability analysis (see Table 18). Based on these results, 
scale items were computed by summing the variables on the four issues which showed 
good reliability; the item concerning the “ban on public smoking” was eliminated due to 
poor reliability. The same analysis was conducted on the remaining issues by clustering 
topics for which parents or the media were most influential; however, these scales 
failed to show acceptable alpha coefficients (see Table 18).
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Table 18
Alpha Coefficients for Factors Based on Perceived Source of Social Norms
Factor Behavior Attitude False Consensus Certainty
Peers .63 .63 .60 .79
Abortion 
Drug legalization 
Lower drinking age 
Free condom distribution
Parents .42 .44 .03 .72
Homosexual adoption 
Gays in the military 
Seatbelt laws 
Ban on public smoking
Media .30 .32 .64 .85
Euthanasia 
Death penalty 
Pornography on Internet 
Insanity plea 
US Aid
Ban on gun sales 
Affirmative action 
Homosexual marriage
Using the newly constructed scales, additional multiple regression analyses were 
run. The results from these analyses provided further support for the original findings. 
The R value for the overall regression was significantly different from 0, £(6,188) = 
73.69, p < .001. Additionally, three of the predictor variables were found to be 
significantly related to people’s behavioral likelihood scores. Attitude (sr2 = .42), 
degree of false consensus (sr2 = .04) and scores on social desirability (sr2 = .01) were
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all found to be significant predictors of behavioral intentions. All six predictors 
variables combined explained 70% (69% adjusted) of the variability in the decision to 
engage in behavior related to the various social issues. Consistent with the separate 
analyses, attitudes were the single largest predictor followed by degree of false 
consensus (see Tables 19 and 20).
Table 19
Correlations between Behavioral Likelihood Scores. Attitude. Degree Of False Consensus 
(FCE). Certainty (Cert). Social Desirability (SD). Self-Esteem (SE). and Self- 
Monitoring (SM) for Peer-Influenced Issues
Variables
Attitude FCE Cert SD SE SM Mean SD N
Behavior .7 9 * * .47** .2 2 * * - . 2 6 * * .16* .10 19.93 5.81 202
Attitude .30** .18 * - . 1 8 * .1 9 * * .10 6.83 8.90 202
FCE . 3 0 * * - . 1 6 * .13 .08 - 10.70 49.91 198
Certainty - . 1 6 * .2 4 * * .18* 14.04 3.26 199
SD .1 5* - . 4 0 * * 13.46 5.14 203
SE .2 4 * * 2.51 .51 203
SM 12.09 4.06 203
*p < .05. **e  < .01.
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Table 20
Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Behavioral Intentions from Attitude. Degree of
False Consensus (FCE). Certainty. Social Desirability (SD). Self-Esteem (SE). and
Self-Monitoring (SM) Based on Peer- influenced Issues
Predictor variables B Beta sr2 t
Attitude .46 .70 .42 16.36
FCE .03 .23 .04 5.16
Certainty - .02 -.01 .00 -.25
SD - .14 - .1 2 .01 - 2 .68
SE .28 .02 .00 .55
SM -.0 4 - .0 3 .00 - .68
Constant 19.08 11.36
R2 = .70
R2 (adjusted) = .69 
R = .84**
*f> < .05. **[)_< .01.
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Gender differences. Identical multiple regression analyses were also conducted 
separately on males and females to determine if any gender differences in people’s 
tendency to engage in certain behaviors existed. However, previous research has not 
found gender differences in terms of false consensus scores; thus no differences were 
predicted. While there were a few unique findings (e.g., males’ behavioral intentions 
were not predicted by social desirability), the overall pattern of results remained 
unchanged. Tables 21 and 22 present the summary analyses based on the peer- 
influenced issues for males and Tables 23 and 24 present the identical analyses for 
females.
Table 21
Correlations between Behavioral Likelihood Scores. Attitude. Degree of False Consensus 
(FCE). Certainty (Cert). Social Desirability (SD). Self-Esteem (SE). and Self- 
Monitoring (SM) for Males on Peer-influenced Issues
Variables
Attitude FCE Cert SD SE SM Mean SD N
Behavior . 7 9 * * . 5 0 * * . 2 9 * * - .3 3 * .29* .13 20.24 5.91 49
Attitude . 3 4 * * .15 - .3 0 * .3 8 * * .23 8.39 8.72 49
FCE . 4 8 * * - .3 2 * .30* .24 -11 .29 44.59 48
Certainty -.23 .22 .19 14.50 3.75 48
SD .04 - . 4 6 * * 13.98 5.14 49
SE .28 2.47 .53 49
SM 12.61 4.32 49
* e <.05. **f i<.01.
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Table 22
Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Behavioral Intentions from Attitude. Degree of
False Consensus (FCE). Certainty. Social Desirability (SD). Self-Esteem (SET and
Self-Monitoring (SM) Based on Peer-Influenced Issues for Males
Predictor variables B Beta sr2 t
Attitude .49 .73 .39 7 .70
FCE .03 .24 .04 2.39
Certainty .03 .02 .00 .20
SD -.13 -.1 1 .01 - 1.12
SE -.29 - .0 3 .00 - .27
SM -.16 - .12 .01 -1 .19
Constant 20.76 5.54
R2 = .74
R2 (adjusted) = .70 
R = .86**
*p < .05. **0 .< .01.
Table 23
Correlations Between Behavioral Likelihood Scores. Attitude. Degree Of False Consensus 
(FCE). Certainty (Cert). Social Desirability (SD). Self-Esteem (SE). And Self- 
Monitoring (SM) for Females on Peer-influenced Issues
Variables
Attitude FCE Cert SD SE SM Mean SD N
Behavior . 7 9 * * . 4 6 * * .18* - . 2 4 * * .13 .09 19.83 5.80 153
Attitude . 2 9 * * .18* -.1 5 .14 .05 6.33 8.94 153
FCE .2 5 * * - .12 .08 .03 -10.51 49.07 150
Certainty - .14 . 2 6 * * .16* 13.89 3.09 151
SD .1 9 *  - . 3 9 * * 13.30 5.15 154
SE .2 4 * * 2.54 .51 154
SM 11.92 3.97 154
* E <  .05. * *e<.01.
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Table 24
Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Behavioral Intentions from Attitude. Degree of
False Consensus (FCE). Certainty. Social Desirability (SD). Self-Esteem (SE). And
Self-Monitorina (SM) Based on Peer-Influenced Issues for Females
Predictor variables B Beta sr2 t
Attitude .46 .70 .43 14.06
FCE .03 .23 .04 4 .57
Certainty - .0 4 - .02 .00 - .4 6
SD - .1 4 - .12 .01 -2 .2 5
SE .40 .04 .00 .66
SM .00 .00 .00 - .03
Constant 18.60 9.59
R2 = .69
R2 (adjusted) = .68 
R = .83**
*E< .05. * *£< .01 .
For both males and females, the R value for peer-influenced issues was 
significantly different from 0, F(6,40) = 18.53, £<.001 andF(6,141) = 53.43, £< 
.001, respectively. For males, attitude toward free condom distribution (sr2 = .39) 
and degree of false consensus (sr2 = .04) were found to be significantly related to 
people’s behavioral likelihood scores. For females, attitude (s i2 = .43), degree of false
consensus (sr2 = .04), and scores on social desirability (sr2 = .01) were also found to 
be significant predictors of behavioral intentions. All three predictor variables 
combined explained 75% (70% adjusted) for males and 69% (68% adjusted) for 
females’ behavioral likelihood scores (see Tables 22 and 24).
Because previous research has not found gender differences in regard to the 
likelihood to demonstrate the false consensus bias, no differences were predicted in this 
study. While a few exceptions emerged, they can probably be explained by analyzing the
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specific topics for which differences were found. Furthermore, women’s scores were 
marginally more influenced by scores on social desirability. This difference may be 
attributed to the nature of the issues examined, such as abortion. Since abortion 
differentially affects men and women, it is not surprising that some of the predictor 
variables varied. However, since the general pattern of results was so consistent, it was 
concluded that gender differences do not play a substantial role in the effect of false 
consensus on behavior. Additionally, the small sample size of males (N = 49) restricted 
the number of analyses that could be conducted solely on that population, so remaining 
analyses were conducted on both male and female subjects combined.
Self-monitoring. In order to test the prediction that high self-monitors would be 
more influenced by false consensus scores, a median split was calculated on the self­
monitoring scores. On the basis of this division, participants whose scores fell above 15 
were classified as high self-monitors (N = 59), while individuals whose scores fell 
below 10 (N = 52) were considered low self-monitors. Based on research which 
suggests that low self-monitors are more consistent in their behaviors, it was 
hypothesized that their behaviors would be predominately predicted by their attitudes.
On the other hand, high self-monitors are predicted to be influenced by various other 
sources, including the social desirability of the behavior and the degree to which they 
display the false consensus effect because of their tendency to match their behavior to 
the situation.
Standard multiple regression analyses were conducted in which attitudes, degree 
of false consensus, and certainty were entered to predict participants’ behavioral 
likelihood scores. The remaining personality variables were eliminated from the 
analyses because of their lack of predictive value and a concern over the ratio of cases to 
predictor variables. These analyses were conducted separately for high and low self­
monitors. in order to facilitate comparisons between high and low self-monitors, 
results from both regression analyses are reported in the tables (the low self-monitors
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scores are in parentheses). In general, the predictions were supported by the findings 
from the analyses. Tables 25 through 39 present the correlations between all of the 
variables and the results of the multiple regression analyses.
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Table 25
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Abortion” for High Self-Monitors
Attitude FCE Cert Mean SD
Behavior . 6 4 * * 4.4,*+ .14 5.49 1.94
Attitude .06 .10 2.98 3.34
FCE .22 -17.69 15.99
Certainty 3.34 .90
Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty. 
*E  < .05. .01.
N = 59.
Table 26
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Abortion” for Low Self-Monitors
Attitude FCE Cert Mean SD
Behavior .7 5 * * .4 9 * * .11 5.71 1.79
Attitude .23 .08 3.02 2.97
FCE .31* -18 .12 15.38
Certainty 3.23 1.02
Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty.
* e <  .05. **f i<.01.
N = 52.
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Table 27
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Likelihood “To Go with a Friend Who Was
Having an Abortion” from Attitude. Degree of False Consensus (FCE). and Certainty for
High and Low Self-Monitors
Predictor variables B Beta sr2 t
Attitude .36(.40) .62(.67) .38( .42) 7 . 0 4 * * ( 7 .8 7 * * )
FCE .05(.04) .40( .35) .16(. 10 ) 4 .5 2 * * ( 3 .9 3 * * )
Certainty - . 0 3 ( - . 0 8 ) -.01 ( - .0 5 ) .OO(.OO) - .1 6  (-.55)
Constant 5.39(5.50) 7 .2 6 * * ( 8 .7 8 * * )
R2 = .58(.67)
R2 (adjusted) = .55(65)
R = .76**( .81**)
Note. Low self-monitor scores are reported in parentheses. 
< .05. **e< .01 .
For both high and low self-monitors, the R. value for the regression concerning 
“the right for a woman to choose an abortion” was significantly different from 0, F( 3, 
55) = 25.04 , p<  .001 andF(3, 48) = 32.42 , e  < -001, respectively. For high self­
monitors, attitude toward abortion (sr2 = .38) and degree of false consensus (sr2 =
.16) were found to be significantly related to people’s likelihood to “go with a friend 
who was having an abortion." All three predictor variables combined explained 58% 
(55% adjusted) of the variability in the decision to go with a friend who was having an
abortion (see Table 20). For low self-monitors, attitude toward abortion (s r2 = .42)
and degree of false consensus (sr2 = .10) were also significant predictors in the 
behavioral likelihood scores. All three predictor variables explained 67% (65% 
adjusted) of the total variability (refer to Table 27).
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Table 28
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Legalization of Drugs” for High Self-
Monitors
Attitude FCE Cert Mean SD
Behavior . 5 6 * * .4 3 * * .25 4.52 2.55
Attitude .24 .3 8 * * .14 3.63
FCE .20 14.69 19.37
Certainty 3.54 1.07
Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty. 
*I> < .05. * *e <  .01.
N = 59.
Table 29
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Legalization of Drugs” for Low Self- 
Monitors
Attitude FCE Cert Mean SD N
Behavior . 5 4 * * -.09 - .03 3.86 2.56 52
Attitude - .04 .14 - .86 3.45 50
FCE .20 14.88 16.66 52
Certainty 3.24 .96 52
Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty. 
*B < .05. * *e <  .01.
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Table 30
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Likelihood “To Smoke Marijuana” from
Attitude. Degree of False Consensus (FCE). and Certainty For High and Low Self-
Monitors
Predictor variables B Beta sr2 t
Attitude .3 4 ( .4 1 ) .49(.56) .19 ( .30 )  4 . 3 0 * * ( 4 .5 2 * * )
FCE . 0 4 ( - . 0 1 ) .31 ( - .06 )  .09 ( .00 )  2 .9 4 * * ( - . 4 6 )
Certainty .0 2 ( - .2 5 )  .01 ( - .10 )  .OO(.OI) .08 ( - . 7 6 )
Constant 3 .80 (5 .12)  3 .9 0 * * (4 .6 1  * * )
R2 = .41 (.32)
R2 (adjusted) = .38(.27) 
R = .64**( .56**)
Note. Low self-monitor scores are reported in parentheses.
*E <  .05. * * e < 0 1 .
For both high and low self-monitors, the R. value was significantly different from 
0  for “legalization and government regulation of drugs”, F(3,55) = 12.93, e  < .001 and 
F(3,46) = 7.17, £> < .001, respectively. For high self-monitors, attitude toward the 
legalization of drugs (s r2 = .19) and degree of false consensus (sr2 = .09) were found 
to be significantly related to people’s likelihood to “smoke marijuana”, while attitudes 
(s r2 = .30) were the only significant predictor for low self-monitors. All three 
predictors variables explained 41% (38% adjusted) of the variability in the decision to 
smoke marijuana for high self-monitors and 31 %(27% adjusted) for low self­
monitors (see Table 30).
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Table 31
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Lowering the Drinking Age" for High
Self-Monitors
Attitude FCE Cert Mean SD
Behavior .6 0 * * .5 0 * * .23 5.00 1.95
Attitude .25 .24 .86 3.79
FCE .14 - 1.68 14.76
Certainty 3.97 1.03
Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty.
< .05. **b < .01.
N = 59.
Table 32
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Lowering the Drinking Age" for Low 
Self-Monitors
Attitude FCE Cert Mean SD N
Behavior .5 8 * * .18 - . 3 4 * 4.44 1.93 52
Attitude .16 .01 .44 3.59 52
FCE .07 - 2.11 15.37 52
Certainty 3.53 1.12 51
Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty.
*B  < .05. **fi < .01.
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Table 33
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Likelihood “To Buv a Beer for an Underaqed
Friend” from Attitude. Degree of False Consensus (FCE). and Certainty for High and Low
Self-Monitors





.25( .30)  
.05 ( .01) 
. 1 2 ( - . 6 1 ) 
4.40(6.47)
.49( .57)  ,22 ( .31 )  4 .8 6 * * (5 .2 8 * * )
.36 ( . l  2) .1 2 ( .0 1 ) 3 .3 7 * * ( 1 .10)
.0 6 ( - .3 5 )  .06 ( .12)  .62 (-3.33**)
5 .8 0 * * (9 .4 7 * * )
R2 = .49(.47)
R2 (adjusted) = .47(.44) 
R = .70**(.69**)
Note. Low self-monitor scores are reported in parentheses. 
*E  < .05. **j> < .01.
TheR. value for “lowering the drinking age to 18” was significantly different 
from 0 for both high and low self-monitors, F(3,55) = 17.90, e < .001 andE(3,47) = 
14.04, g < .001, respectively. For high self-monitors, attitude towards lowering the
drinking age (sr2 = .22) and degree of false consensus (s r2 = . 12) were found to be 
significantly related to people’s likelihood “to buy a beer for an underaged friend”, 
while for low self-monitors, attitude (sr2 = .31) and certainty (s i2 = .12) were 
significant predictor of behavioral intentions. The three predictor variables combined 
explained 49% (47% adjusted) of the variability in the decision to buy a beer for an 
underaged friend for high self-monitors and 47% (44% adjusted) for low self­
monitors (see Table 33).
84
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 34
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Ban on Public Smoking” for High
Self-Monitors
Attitude FCE Cert Mean SD
Behavior . 6 9 * * - .0 2 - .16 3.47 2.31
Attitude - .0 3 - .16 .00 3.79
FCE -.11 .30 21.49
Certainty 3.32 1.06
Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty. 
*g  < .05. **J3 < .01.
N= 59.
Table 35
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Ban on Public Smoking” for Low 
Self-Monitors
Attitude FCE Cert Mean SD N
Behavior .6 6 * * .05 .20 3.69 2.11 52
Attitude .07 .10 .73 3.62 52
FCE .07 2.94 17.58 52
Certainty 2.96 1.10 50
Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty.
*B <  .05. **g < .01.
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Table 36
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Likelihood “To Go Only to Non-Smoking Bars
and Restaurants” from Attitude. Degree of False Consensus (FCE). and Certainty for High
and Low Self-Monitors
Predictor variables B Beta sr2 t
Attitude .41 (.37)  .68( .63)  .45( .40)  6 . 9 3 * * ( 5 . 6 7 * * )
FCE .OO(.OO) .OO(- .OI) .OO(.OO) - .0 5  ( - . 1 0 )
Certainty -.1 1 (2 5 )  - .0 5 ( .1 3 )  .00 ( .02)  - .5 2  (1 .1 8 )
Constant 3 .85(2 .67)  5 .1 2 * * ( 4 . 0 2 * * )
R2 = .48(.43)
R2 (adjusted) = .45(.40) 
R = .69**( .66** )
Note. Low self-monitor scores are reported in parentheses.
* p <  -05. **p < .01.
For both high and low self-monitors, the R value for the regression analysis for 
the “ban on public smoking” issue was significantly different from 0, £(3,55)  =17.00, 
p <.001 and F(3,46) = 11.76, p < .001, respectively. However, only attitude (sr2 = 
.45 for high self-monitors and .40 for low self-monitors) was found to be significantly 
related to people’s likelihood to “go only to non-smoking restaurants and bars.” The 
three predictor variables combined explained 48% (45% adjusted) for high self­
monitors and 43% (40% adjusted) for low self-monitors of the variability in the 
decision to go only to non-smoking establishments (see Table 36).
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Table 37
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Free Condom Distribution in High
Schools” for High Self-Monitors
Attitude FCE Cert Mean SD
Behavior .7 2 * * .6 7 * * .2 6 * 5.29 2.11
Attitude .53** . 3 6 * * 3.25 2.38
FCE . 3 6 * * -7 .02 19.02
Certainty 3.81 1.04
Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty.
*g  < .05. **fi<.01. 
N = 59.
Table 38
Correlations. Means, and Standard Deviations for “Free Condom Distribution in High 
Schools" for Low Self-Monitors
Attitude FCE Cert Mean SD N
Behavior .9 1 * * .56** . 4 3 * * 5.00 1.93 52
Attitude .46** . 4 2 * * 2.29 3.02 52
FCE .3 3 * - 10.22 19.65 51
Certainty 3.39 1.18 51
Note. FCE = degree of false consensus; Cert = certainty.
* jj < .05. **g < .01.
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Table 39
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Likelihood “To Distribute Free Condoms to High
School Seniors* from Attitude. Degree of False Consensus (FCE). and Certainty for High
and Low Self-Monitors
Predictor variables B Beta sr2 t
Attitude .4 8 (.5 2 ) .5 4 (.8 1 ) .2 0 (.4 6 ) 5 .6 3 **(1  2.1 8 ** )
FCE .0 4 (.0 2 ) .4 2 (.l 7) .1 2 (.0 2 ) 4 .2 9 * * (2 .6 7 * * )
Certainty -.2 2 (.0 6 ) -.11  (.0 3 ) .01 (.0 0 ) -1 .2 6  ( - .5 6 )
Constant 4 .9 7 (3 .7 7 ) 6.61 **(1  0.1 0 * * )
R2 = .66 (.85)
R2 (adjusted) = .64(.i
R = .81 **(.9 2 **)
Note. Low self-monitor scores are reported in parentheses. 
*p <  .05. **g  < .01.
For both high and low self-monitors, the R value for “free condom distribution 
in high schools” was significantly different from 0, F(3,55) = 33.56, g<.001 and 
F(3,47) = 89.48, < .001. For high self-monitors, attitude toward free condom
distribution (s r2 = .20) and degree of false consensus (sr2 = .12) were found to be 
significantly related to people’s likelihood to “distribute free condoms to high school 
seniors.” For low self-monitors, attitude (sr2 = .46) and degree of false consensus 
(s r2 = .02) were also found to be significant predictors of behavioral intentions. All 
three predictor variables combined explained 66% (64% adjusted) for high self­
monitors and 85% (84% adjusted) for low self-monitors of the variability in the 
decision to distribute free condoms to high school seniors (see Table 39).
To summarize the results from the five selected issues, attitudes were a 
significant predictor for all five issues for both high and low self-monitors. For high 
self-monitors, degree of false consensus was significant for each issue, except “ban on 
public smoking”, while it was only predictive for “the right for a woman to choose an
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abortion” and “free condom distribution in high schools” for low self-monitors. 
Furthermore, attitudes were a stronger predictor for low self-monitors than high self­
monitors for each issue, although the correlations between attitudes and behavior were 
not significantly different (Edwards, 1984).
These results were supported by the findings from the combined scale items. In 
fact, these analyses demonstrate the differences between high and low self-monitors 
even more clearly. The correlations and regression analyses for high and low self­
monitors are presented in Tables 40-43.
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Table 40
Correlations Between Behavioral Likelihood Scores. Attitude. Degree of False Consensus
(FCE). and Certainty (Cert) for High Self-Monitors on Peer-influenced Issues
Variables
Attitude FCE Cert Mean SD N
Behavior .7 2 * * .5 4 * * .3 1 * 20.30 5.86 59
Attitude .3 4 * .3 0 * 7.24 9.37 59
FCE .25 -1 0 .2 6 44.53 57
Certainty 14.66 3.21 59
*e  < .05. **e<-01.
Table 41
Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Behavioral Intentions from Attitude. Degree of 
False Consensus (FCE). and Certainty Based on Peer-Influenced Issues for High Self- 
Monitors
Predictor variables B Beta sr2 t
Attitude .40 .64 .34 7.1 3 **
FCE .04 .33 .09 3 .7 4 **
Certainty -.0 4 -.02 .00 -.2 2
Constant 18.60 7 .6 2 **
R2 = .65
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Table 42
Correlations Between Behavioral Likelihood Scores. Attitude. Degree Of False Consensus
(FCE). and Certainty (Cert) for Low Self-Monitors on Peer-influenced Issues
Variables
Attitude FCE Cert Mean SD N
Behavior .8 5 * * .23 .03 19.02 5.95 52
Attitude .11 .10 4.88 9.37 52
FCE .2 8 * -1 5 .4 7 42.28 51
Certainty 13.38 3.49 50
Table 43
Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Behavioral Intentions from Attitude. Degree Of 
False Consensus (FCE). And Certainty Based on Peer-Influenced Issues for Low Self- 
Monitors
Predictor variables B Beta s r2 t
Attitude .54 .85 .71 11.92
FCE .02 .16 .02 2.21
Certainty -.1 7 - .1 0 .01 -1 .33
Constant 18.90 10.41
R2 = .77
R2 (adjusted) = .75 
R = .88**
*fi_< .05. **fi< .0 1 .
For both high and low self-monitors, the R value for peer-influenced issues was 
significantly different from 0, F(3,53) = 32.39, p < .001  andE(3, 46) = 50.99, p< 
.001, respectively. For high self-monitors, attitude (s r2 = .34) and degree of false 
consensus (s r2 = .09) were found to be significantly related to people’s behavioral
91
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
likelihood scores. For low self-monitors, attitude (sr2 = .71) and degree of false 
consensus (sr2 = .02) were also found to be significant predictors of behavioral 
intentions. All three predictor variables combined explained 65% (63% adjusted) for 
high self-monitors and 77% (75% adjusted) for low self-monitors’ behavioral 
likelihood scores (see Tables 41 and 43).
Across all twenty issues, for high self-monitors, attitudes served as a significant 
predictor for all twenty of the items, while degree of false consensus was a significant 
predictor for twelve of the twenty issues. Certainty was predictive for only three of the 
topics. In support of the hypothesis, for low self-monitors, attitudes were a significant 
predictor of behavioral intentions for nineteen of the twenty issues, while degree of false 
consensus was a significant predictor for only six topics. Certainty scores were only 
predictive in one of the total analyses.
Together, these results suggest that peer influence differs for individuals who 
are high versus low in self-monitors. High self-monitors are generally more 
influenced by their perceptions of their peers’ beliefs (i.e., false consensus scores).
This finding supports Kraus’ (1995) assertion that self-monitoring moderates the 
attitude-behavior relation. Low self-monitors appear to be reporting that they would 
behave in a manner consistent with their underlying attitudes, while high self-monitors 
are trying to adapt their behavior to fit their surroundings; in this case, their 
perceptions of their peers’ behavior. These differences suggest that intervention 
campaigns should be structured differently for both groups. Individuals who are high 
self-monitors could be reached effectively by using peer interventions, while low self­
monitors need persuasion directed at internal beliefs. Evidence from persuasion studies 
has shown that different types of approaches work better on these groups; commercials 
aimed at improving one’s image worked better for high self-monitors, while 
advertisements directed at quality were more effective for low self-monitors (DeBono &
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Packer, 1991). This type of technique could probably be used effectively in 
intervention programs designed for individuals who are considered high or low self­
monitors.
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IV. STUDY 3
Study 2 demonstrated that false consensus beliefs predict behavioral intentions 
related to current social issues. Research has already shown that norm misperceptions 
contribute to teenage smoking (Botvin, Botvin, Baker, Dusenbury, & Goldberg (1992), 
excessive college drinking (Prentice & Miller, 1993), and dangerous sexual practices 
(Chan & Fishbein, 1993; Morrison, Gillmore, & Baker, 1995; Tashakkori & 
Thompson, 1992; White, Terry, & Hogg, 1994). Consequently, it seems important to 
try to correct these misperceptions. Many researchers have suggested that intervention 
programs would be more successful if they focused on changing normative 
misperceptions (Kelly e t al., 1991, 1992; Sherman et al., 1983). Therefore, Study 3 
attempted to reduce the false consensus bias related to social norms. This reduction 
should hopefully correct some misperceptions about the prevalence of shared support 
for certain positions.
A recent set of experiments determined that the false consensus effect is an 
“ineradicable bias” (Krueger & Clement, 1994). In a series of studies designed to 
correct the bias, the researchers concluded that people are generally unable to avoid 
making this egocentric error. In the first experiment, they provided people with two 
different types of information. In one condition, they described the false consensus bias 
before people made the peer estimates. Other subjects received feedback information 
regarding the actual consensus for each item after they made their judgments. [Note: In 
order to obtain accurate statistics regarding the actual consensus, the researchers used 
MMPI items which have been tested and scaled on thousands of subjects.] The final group 
read both types of information. Using several measures of false consensus, they 
concluded that the effect is robust and immune to education or feedback about the bias.
94
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Additionally, they controlled for social desirability of the statements, so they could state 
that bias was not a result of endorsing socially desirable items.
In a second study, subjects were given information about a hypothetical subject 
who either agreed or disagreed with their position based on random assignment. They 
were also asked to estimate the percentage of consensus that this hypothetical person 
would give. Finally, they gave another estimate of consensus based on their own position. 
Additionally, the order of the questionnaires was varied, such that subjects either 
completed the self or other estimate first. The researchers expected that possessing 
information about another person's position would eliminate the basic projection effect. 
However, this information had little impact on people's estimates (i.e., they did not 
incorporate this additional information into their judgment). In sum, the researchers 
stated conclusively that the false consensus bias was persistent even in the face of 
contradictory or illustrative statistical information.
While Krueger and Clement (1994) stated that the effect could not be eliminated, 
other researchers have found evidence that the effect can be modified by altering several 
features of the typical design to assess false consensus. In a meta-analysis of 115 tests 
of the false consensus effect studies, Mullen et al. (1985) found that several variables 
influenced this robust effect. While the nature of the comparison population did not 
affect the findings, the order of measurement and the number of estimates were found to 
influence the effect. Specifically, the effect size was larger when there were fewer 
items and when estimates for consensus were made before endorsements.
Furthermore, the number of available options has been shown to reduce the false 
consensus effect (Marks & Duval, 1991). By presenting subjects with different 
numbers of response alternatives, the authors were able to determine that false 
consensus is influenced by the availability heuristic. By making other positions salient 
to the subjects, it reduced the tendency to assume that most people shared their beliefs.
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van der Pligt, Eiser, and Spears (1987) supported the finding that the effect was 
reduced by giving people more response options. In a study on attitudes toward nuclear 
power, subjects were asked to estimate how much power was derived from various 
energy-producing sources (e.g., coal, oil, nuclear power), as well as their own personal 
preferences for power sources. In a series of studies, the researchers found that 
subjects gave higher estimates of consensus when fewer alternatives were listed. In 
other words, people were more likely to demonstrate false consensus if they were not 
made aware of other potential energy resources. When additional options were 
presented, people tended to reduce their estimates, thereby reducing the consensus bias. 
The authors concluded that simply reminding participants about alternative energy 
sources forced them to give more weight to these possibilities. Based on selective 
exposure, it was predicted that the false consensus effect would be reduced by presenting 
subjects with arguments supporting both sides of each social issue.
In another test of this theory, Bosveld, Koomen and van der Pligt (1994) asked 
people to “think aloud” when estimating the prevalence of attitudes about various issues. 
Their answers were tape-recorded and coded for the mention of similar or dissimilar 
referents. As predicted, people were more likely to mention similar others, which led to 
larger false consensus effects. When people did mention dissimilar others, typically 
subjects who fell in the minority, false consensus was reduced. Therefore, the 
availability heuristic does seem to account, at least in part, for the FCE. People are 
using their peers as a reference group by which to judge the social norms. Then, when 
they are asked to estimate consensus among fellow college students, their close friends’ 
attitudes and beliefs are recalled most easily.
The role of selective exposure as a contributing factor for the FCE related to 
adolescent smoking behavior was tested directly by Sherman et al. (1983). They found 
that adolescents who overestimated the prevalence of smoking among their peers were 
significantly more likely to smoke themselves. Additionally, the number of friends who
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smoked explained a substantial amount of the variance in peer estimates, suggesting that 
high school students were basing their judgments on a limited sample (i.e., their 
friends). Deutsch (1987) added additional support for this finding by stating that the 
FCE was strongest when people's judgments were similar to their friends. Overall, 
these findings provide additional support for the idea that selective exposure leads to 
false consensus bias.
Based on this research, it was hypothesized that the FCE would be reduced by 
exposing subjects to information supporting both sides of controversial social issues. 
Exposing subjects to information pertaining to all sides of the debate should correct for 
the availability heuristic by making both positions salient to the participants. In other 
words, it should reduce people’s tendency to simply recall their friends’ beliefs when 
asked about their peers; they will have other information on which to base their 
estimates. In their review article, Marks and Miller (1987) discussed the role of focus 
of attention and argued that "when one's focus shifts between two or more positions, 
estimates of consensus for any one may be diluted; that is, estimates may be more or 
less evenly distributed among the alternatives (p. 73)." Consequently, this experiment 
examined the potential influence of selective exposure by presenting students with 
information regarding two current social issues: the legalization and government 
regulation of drugs and animal testing for medical purposes. Additionally, the medium of 
presentation was varied to determine if written or visual information would be more 
effective in reducing the bias.
It was predicted that the effect would be most dramatically reduced in the video 
condition because this type of presentation should control for the influence of both 
cognitive and motivational explanations. Selective exposure would be eliminated in both 
the written and video conditions; however, the motivational need to believe that other 
relevant people share the same perspective will only be addressed by the video condition. 
Watching peers discuss the issues and argue for both sides should help to reduce the
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tendency to overestimate support for the students’ personal positions caused by a 
motivational drive to be similar to one’s peers.
Last, the correlation between participants’ attitudes and consensus estimates 
should be reduced if the technique is effective. If additional information is made 
‘available’ to the students, their estimates should be based in part on this information, 
rather than entirely on their own attitudes. However, if this information is unavailable 




Two hundred and eighty students (101 males and 177 females) participated in 
this study in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. The subjects ranged in age 
from 17 to 30 with an average age of 18.57 (SD = 1.21). The majority of students 
were freshmen (82%) who were Caucasian (97%) and Catholic (57%). Additionally, 
68 percent defined themselves as liberal, while 24 percent considered themselves 
conservative. Sixty four percent of the sample believed that they were “similar to their 
peers” while seventy eight percent of the students believed that “most college students 
try to be similar to their peers.”
Numerous subjects were eliminated in order to reduce the amount of error in the 
experiment. Six subjects were eliminated because they mistakenly participated in the 
experiment twice. Ten subjects were eliminated from the animal testing analyses 
because their answers were illogical. Subjects were excluded on this basis if their 
endorsement and attitudinal position were negatively correlated (e.g., they reported 
being in favor of animal testing and being strongly against it). Additionally, participants 
were eliminated if there was no relation between their endorsement and their estimate 
(e.g., they reported being against animal testing, but believed that 100% of their peers
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were in favor of this attitude). Eleven participants were removed from the analyses 
regarding the legalization of drugs for the same reasons.
Materials
This experiment was designed to eliminate the selective exposure bias.
Therefore, packets of information were created to inform people about viewpoints for 
both positions. For the two 'written' experimental conditions, material was collected 
from books, journal articles, and reference sources (e.g., brochures and pamphlets) 
which supported both sides of the selected issues (animal testing for medical purposes 
and legalization of drugs). These issues were selected based on the size and consistency 
of the FCE in pilot studies. Two different combinations were created to control for the 
effects of order. Half of the folders presented the supporting information followed by the 
opposing information for each issue, while the remaining folders reversed the order 
(see Appendices K and L).
A third experimental condition ('video') was also utilized. In this condition, 
subjects watched a video of college students engaging in debates surrounding the selected 
issues. People volunteered to participate in this debate on the basis of their personal 
attitudes in order to ensure controversy and a full coverage of each issue. In this 
condition, subjects watched the video clip rather than read any material. This medium of 
presentation was hypothesized to be more meaningful and therefore convincing to other 
college students.
A control condition was also utilized. In the true control, subjects did not read 
any information, but filled out identical questionnaires. This condition was necessary in 
order to determine if the manipulations reduce the false consensus bias relative to 
subjects who were given no information.
Knowledge quizzes for each condition, except the true control, were also designed 
to assess subjects' comprehension of the material. This test served three important 
functions: to ensure that subjects read the material carefully, to act as a manipulation
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check to eliminate subjects who failed to process the information, and to reinforce the 
dual nature of these issues. For example, one item on the quiz asked subjects to briefly 
summarize one benefit and one problem with animal testing. For the experimental 
conditions, two different orders were again created to control for the effects of 
presentation (See Appendices M and N).
Design
Participants in this experiment were approximately evenly divided between five 
conditions; written-animal (N = 57), written-drugs (N = 60), control (N = 56), 
video-animal (N = 48), and video-drugs (N = 59). Furthermore, the order of 
presentation of the material in the written conditions were fairly evenly split; pro 
material followed by anti (N = 57), anti material followed by pro (N = 60). Last, the 
order of the knowledge quiz was varied such that 107 subjects completed version A, 
while 117 subjects received version B.
Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the five conditions. For each 
condition, except the control group, participants were informed that they would take a 
brief quiz tapping their understanding of this material. They were then asked to read the 
packet of information or view the videotape. Participants were given fifteen minutes to 
read/view the information. After being presented with the material, they completed 
several personality measures, including social desirability, social self-esteem, and 
self-monitoring, which served as filler items. Upon completion of these scales, all 
subjects were given the open-ended test. When all subjects completed the quiz, they 
filled out the brief false consensus measure described in Study 2 (consisting only of the 
self endorsements and peer estimates), an attitudinal questionnaire, and demographic 
information. Participants in the control group were only give the questionnaire with no
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additional information. Last, subjects were debriefed and thanked for their 
participation.
Results
It was predicted that the false consensus effect would be reduced in the 
intervention conditions. All analyses were conducted separately for the two issues 
(“legalization and government regulation of drugs” and “animal testing for medical 
purposes”). First, it was necessary to determine if there were any order effects based 
on the presentation of the material. To examine this possibility, a 2 (endorsement: for 
or against) by 4 (condition: written - Order A; written - Order B; control, and video) 
analysis of variance was conducted on each issue to determine if there were any order 
effects. The results from this analysis showed that there were no significant differences 
between conditions, E (3,140) = 1.64, ns for animal testing and F(3, 173) = 1.03, ns 
for drug legalization. However, both issues showed a significant effect for endorsement 
indicating that false consensus effect was still occurring, F(1,140) = 40.01, g < .001 
for animal testing and F(1,173) = 26.32, g < .001 for drug legalization. Additionally, 
there was a marginally significant interaction effect, F(3,140) = 2.57, g = .057 for 
animal testing such that consensus estimates decreased for people who endorsed an item, 
while they increased for individuals who opposed the statement based upon exposure to 
the information (see Table 44). The legalization of drugs item did not have a significant 
interaction. Because the written experimental groups were not significantly different 
and therefore order was not a significant factor, these groups were collapsed, so that all 
comparisons will be made between the written, video, and control groups.
To assess the false consensus effect, t-tests were run for each condition to 
determine the extent of the false consensus bias. Using a Bonferroni correction to 
control for the number of analyses reduced the appropriate significance level to .008. 
For both animal testing and the legalization of drugs, the false consensus effect was
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reduced by the manipulation. In fact, it was completely eliminated in the video condition 
for both animal testing and the legalization of drugs. Table 44 presents the results of the 
t-tests, including the means, standard deviations, number of subjects, the t  value and 
significance level for each comparison 
Table 44
False Consensus Tests for Control. Written, and Video Conditions for “Animal Testing for 
Medical Purposes” and “Legalization of Drugs”
Condition Animal Testina
For Aaainst
Mean SD N Mean SD N t_ £
Control 6 5 .3 0 (1 8 .02 )[33 ] 2 8 .3 3 (2 0 .04)[1  2] 5.91 .0 0 0 **
Written 6 5 .1 4 (2 0 .22 )[3 7 ] 44.09(1 7 .4 4 )[1 1] 3.12 .003*
Video 56.05(1 6.01 )[4 3 ] 4 6 .0 0 (2 5 .1 0 )[5 ] 1.25 .217
Leqalization of Druas
For Aaainst
Mean SD N Mean SD N t £
Control 79.11(13.81 )[2 8 ] 60.28(1  8 .4 7 )[2 8 ] 4.32 .0 0 0 **
Written 70.80(20.1 3 )[3 0 ] 5 6 .9 0 (20 .5  9) [2 9 ] 2.62 .011*
Video 72.64(13.31 )[3 4 ] 6 2 .6 0 (2 1 .7 5 )[2 5 ] 2.04 .048*
< .05. **c  < .008.
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In order to determine the statistical effectiveness of the manipulation, effect 
sizes (d) were calculated based on each pairwise comparison (Cohen, 1988). As 
expected based on the hypothesis, the effect size was affected by the manipulation. The 
differences between the groups (people who were for or against each issue) were largest 
in the control condition and smallest in the video condition. These values are reported in 
Table 45.
Table 45
Effect Size Analysis of Conditions for “Animal Testing for Medical Purposes” and 
“Legalization of Drugs”
Condition Issue
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The final analysis examined the correlation between participants’ attitudes which 
were measured on an 11 point Likert scale ranging from -5 (strongly disagree) to +5 
(strongly agree) and their estimates. It was predicted that people’s attitudes should be 
highly correlated with their consensus estimates if they are committing the false 
consensus error; however, if their estimates are based on information separate from 
their personal attitudes, these relations should be weaker. Subsequently, if the 
manipulations are reducing the influence of selective exposure by giving people 
additional relevant information about the social issues, their estimates might be revised 
by this new information. This prediction was supported by an observation of the 
correlations between attitudes and estimates, which are presented in Table 46. The 
correlations were strongest in the control condition and weakest in the video condition 
for both animal testing and the legalization of drugs.
Table 46
Correlations Between Attitude and Estimates for each Condition for “Animal Testing for 
Medical Purposes” and “Legalization of Drugs”
Issue
Animal testina Leaalization of druas
Condition R N R N
Control .6 7 * * 45 .4 0 ** 56
W ritten .5 0 * * 48 .2 8 * 58
Video .31* 48 .23 59
* f i < .05. **p < .01.
104
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Discussion
it was hypothesized that the false consensus effect would be reduced by using an 
intervention technique designed to eliminate selective exposure to information 
supporting participants’ personal beliefs. This prediction was supported. In fact, the 
effect was completely eliminated using the video condition, which was unexpected. While 
the sample size for the conditions was considerably smaller than previous studies, it was 
relative to the control condition to which the groups were compared, therefore, the 
results lend strong support to the hypothesis. Examination of the means suggested that 
the manipulation works by causing both groups (people for and against each issue) to 
converge toward the average estimate as suggested by Marks and Miller (1987).
Analysis of Cohen’s d as a measure of the effect size provides further evidence that the 
manipulation was effective. Effect size analyses are independent of sample size, thus the 
results showed that the group differences were becoming smaller, as their estimates 
were converging regardless of the number of subjects in the groups. For both topics, the 
effect size for the control groups was very large, while the video conditions had medium 
effect sizes as established by Cohen’s effect size conventions (Cohen, 1988).
Furthermore, these analyses provided evidence for the hypothesis that the video 
condition would be the most effective form of presentation. While it was not possible to 
determine if the increased effectiveness was attributable to changes in participants’ 
motivational states, it might be a testable hypothesis for the future. If the video medium 
was most effective because it showed peers discussing the topics, perhaps a transcript of 
the debate emphasizing the nature of the participants would be equally effective. By 
designing a study in which two additional conditions were added; a written condition 
based on the transcript of a peer debate and a video condition presenting authority 
figures describing the various viewpoints, it might be possible to partial out the effects 
of medium of presentation and the effects of the reference group. This type of study
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would also enable researchers to determine if the false consensus effect was more 
affected by cognitive or motivational biases.
Overall, this experiment provided evidence and hope that intervention strategies 
can be effectively directed at students’ misperceptions about social norms. By reducing 
the false consensus effect, subjects are less likely to base their estimates of peers’ 
beliefs on their own attitudes; rather they are using other available information to 
make this decision, if they are exposed to information which revises the normative 
influence, it might help to eliminate problem behaviors on campus.
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V. GENERAL DISCUSSION
Overall, these studies demonstrated that people make systematic errors in 
identifying social norms concerning social issues. Evidence suggests that people 
consistently exhibit the false consensus bias (Mullen et al., 1985; Ross, Greene, & 
House, 1977) in which they perceive their positions are relatively more common than 
alternate beliefs. Study 1 demonstrated that this effect was also evident for social 
issues, regardless of manipulations in the wording or order of presentation. This finding 
might be due in part to people's lack of awareness about these topics or to selective 
exposure to a restricted homogenous sample. While various viewpoints were 
represented on all of the issues (i.e., there were people who were pro-choice and pro­
life in the study), individuals who hold different beliefs may not be affiliating on campus 
as people tend to be friends with people who hold similar attitudes. Another explanation 
might be that people simply have a greater understanding of their personal viewpoints. 
Because attitudes are predominately internal traits, which may not be manifested in 
outward behavior, it is easy to see how people might have difficulty estimating the 
opinions of their peers. In fact, people were more likely to commit the FCE for 
attitudinal rather than behavioral items. Many of the false consensus studies have 
examined external characteristics, such as physical traits (e.g., eye color) or behavior 
(e.g., Ross, Greene, & House, 1977; Marks & Miller, 1987). In these cases, 
individuals do not have greater access to their own personal characteristics or actions.
Study 2 examined if these biases were a significant predictor of people's 
behavioral intentions related to these beliefs. Using Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) 
theory of reasoned action as a model, it was predicted that the degree to which people 
demonstrate false consensus would influence their behavioral intentions on each issue.
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This measure controlled for participants' personal position on each item by asking 
people to rate their attitude for each issue. It was demonstrated that the inclusion of the 
FCE measure did account for additional variance in explaining behavioral intentions. 
Because people's perceptions of social norms do seem to influence their self-reported 
behavioral intentions (and presumably actual behavior related to each issue), it is 
important to correct these inaccurate beliefs. Therefore, Study 3 was designed to reduce 
the false consensus effect
While a substantial number of researchers have suggested that selective 
exposure leads to a false consensus bias, no studies to date have attempted to reduce false 
consensus directly by eliminating the selective exposure effect The final study in this 
experiment addressed these concerns. It was proposed that exposing subjects to both 
sides of the issue would make the alternative position salient, thereby reducing false 
consensus for both the written and video groups. However, it was argued that 
motivational explanations might better explain the discrepancies, in which case the 
manipulation would be less effective in the written condition, which presented only 
statistical information from experts in the field. The findings suggested that both 
methods effectively reduced the bias, but the video presentation had a greater impact, 
which implies that both cognitive and motivational biases play a role in false consensus. 
Future research will need to be conducted in order to more definitively state the cause of 
the FCE.
Limitations
This series of studies is prone to several limitations. First, Study 2 examined 
behavioral intentions, rather than actual behavior. Using such a broad scope of social 
issues necessitates the use of behavioral intentions rather than actual behaviors due to 
the inherent difficulty in collecting the relevant data. Researchers wishing to focus on 
specific topics might find the resources required to collect accurate behavioral data, but 
employing a range of issues limits the research to intentions. Additionally, some of the
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topics are highly sensitive, such as drug use, which prohibits the use of actual 
behavioral measures. However, Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) have demonstrated that 
behavioral intentions are a good predictor of behavior (see also van den Putte, 1991).
Furthermore, it is not possible to establish cause and effect relations using the 
false consensus paradigm. Utilizing regression analyses can assess the relative 
contribution of a number of variables, including the impact of the degree to which they 
display false consensus, but it is not possible to randomly assign people to a biased 
position. Therefore, this research only addresses the relative impact of false consensus 
on behavioral intentions, while not making any causal predictions. However, previous 
longitudinal research has demonstrated that people who overestimate the percentage of 
people who engage in a particular behavior, such as smoking are more likely to smoke or 
begin smoking (Chassin et al.,1984). This longitudinal evidence suggests that these 
misperceptions do shape future behavior.
Future Directions
In order to address more clearly the questions examined by this research, future 
studies need to be conducted. For example, it would be helpful to assess the media’s role 
in shaping social norms for college students. Careful examination of exposure to media 
sources might provide important information regarding the source of college students’ 
beliefs. In a recent course assignment, students were asked to write on their views 
regarding homosexual marriage. Several students cited the MTV show “The Real World” 
as the source of their beliefs on this issue. Educators should not underestimate the 
impact that media has on students and future research should more carefully examine its 
long-term effects on normative beliefs. Moreover, longitudinal studies which examine 
behavior should also be conducted in order to determine which social groups actually 
have the most influence in determining social norms, rather than relying on students’ 
perceptions. Furthermore, this type of extended study would allow researchers to
109
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
determine if normative influences and various intervention techniques have lasting 
effects.
Another interesting question addresses the age groups for which these findings 
are most evident Much of the research has examined adolescents and college students, 
while neglecting older adults. College students might want to feel unique or distinct 
(Fromkin, 1972) from their peers at this point in the life, whereas older individuals 
may not display this tendency. On the other hand, college-aged students might want to 
protect their self-esteem by assuming that their peers share their viewpoints. To 
answer this question, longitudinal studies or studies on different aged populations might 
be informative.
Further research also needs to be conducted in order to determine if motivational 
versus cognitive explanations best account for the false consensus bias. While it is 
extremely difficult to separate these two influences, it might be possible to identify 
which intervention techniques are most effective and then establish which influence was 
the larger contributor. This method is similar to trying various neurotransmitter- 
based drugs in an attempt to narrow down the potential causes of various diseases (e.g., 
attention-deficit disorder). Using this method might allow practical intervention 
techniques to be developed while also answering a basic research question.
While false consensus did not appear to function as a individual difference 
variable to predict people’s behavioral intentions (i.e., TFCE) (Krueger & Zeiger,
1993), it might work in different domains, such as abilities, personal preferences, or 
personality traits. Therefore, it would be an interesting question to address in the 
future by measuring this general tendency using different types of items.
Implications
This type of research has important implications. Intervention programs aimed 
at correcting social problems should include a technique used to reduce misperceptions. 
Previous research has found that correcting misperceptions can lead to changes in
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behavior (see Kelly et al.„ 1991, 1992; Trafimow, 1994). If people can be made 
aware of the false consensus bias, it might cause them to rethink their actions and more 
carefully consider the ramifications of their behavior.
Norman and Tedeschi (1989) argued that in order for intervention techniques to 
be successful, they must focus on normative thinking as well as individual attitudes.
They designed an intervention plan to combat teen smoking, which included a medical 
component, which addressed the negative health of effects of cigarettes and a social 
identity component which emphasized the negative image associated with smokers. While 
their intervention was not successful, the research did suggest that the normative 
component is equally important in trying to change adolescents’ perceptions of smoking; 
simply knowing “the facts” is not sufficient to deter them from adopting a habit that 
they perceive will make them more socially acceptable. Additional support was garnered 
by Gibbons, Gerrard, and McCoy’s (1995) research on pregnancy prevention in 
adolescent girls. They found evidence that girls’ perceptions of their peers, in the form 
of the “unwed mother prototype” did predict their willingness to engage in unprotected 
sex, regardless of their attitudes toward birth control. Similar research examined 
health risks in college students, which demonstrated that prototype perception was 
related to risk behaviors, such as drinking and driving (see Gibbons & Gerrard, 1995), 
such that perceptions guided behaviors and behaviors shaped perceptions. Gibbons and 
his colleagues have also noted that self-esteem plays a role in these types of decisions 
(Gibbons, Eggleston, & Benthin, 1997). Furthermore, they argued that educators 
trying to reduce the risk of these behaviors should focus on the peer image being 
portrayed.
This advice is particularly relevant given the differential impact of various 
groups on establishing normative behaviors. Because of the powerful impact of the 
media, commercials directed at adolescents can leave very lasting impressions, 
especially if they are portraying behaviors as desirable and leading to increased
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acceptance. Advertisements for beer and cigarettes aimed at teenagers are especially 
dangerous because they are capitalizing on the peer model; they repeatedly show young, 
attractive, healthy individuals engaging in fun activities. On the other hand, public 
service commercials rarely use this approach, instead they rely heavily on scientific 
and medical evidence to make their point. If they could effectively change the image 
associated with the behaviors using relevant peer groups, they would have a greater 
impact on teenagers. Recent appeals do seem to be addressing this concern. A recent 
anti-smoking commercial shows a young women whose life has been ruined by 
cigarettes; she has emphysema, had a lung-removed, and must take medicine which has 
caused physical deformities. While the facts alone would probably not alter teens’ 
behavior, she mentions that she began smoking to look older and concludes that it worked. 
As she is making this statement, they show a picture of a young attractive girl who looks 
nothing like the woman speaking. Hopefully, this commercial will decrease the image- 
promoting appeal of cigarettes. Similarly, announcements which use popular television 
stars might serve a similar purpose by creating a desirable social image associated with 
safer behaviors (e.g., abstinence).
Conclusion
Last, it is important to address the question: Has this research provided support 
for the key assumptions related to norm perception? The social influence literature 
provides compelling evidence that people do in fact base their behavior and attitudes on 
social norms (e.g., Asch, 1955; Festinger, 1954; Newcomb, 1943; Sherif, 1936). 
Furthermore, this research has clearly demonstrated that people perceive their 
parents, peers, and the media to have the greatest impact on their beliefs. However, 
consistent with previous research (e.g., Ross, Greene, & House, 1977), people make 
systematic biases in their estimation of normative beliefs, namely they overestimate 
support for their personal position (i.e., demonstrate the false consensus bias).
Finally, these misperceptions do influence people's behavioral intentions. Consistent
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with Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) theory of reasoned action, the findings suggest that 
the degree to which people overestimate support for their position relative to people who 
hold an opposing view does impact their likelihood to engage in certain acts. Thus, people 
are not reporting that they will behave solely according to their attitudes, but rather 
their misperceptions are also shaping their intended actions. Consequently, people's 
interpretations of social norms incorrectly bias their responses and potentially their 
behavior. Therefore, it is especially important to develop techniques to correct this 
bias, which was successfully demonstrated by the manipulation utilized in the final 
study.
In sum, this research addresses many important issues related to current social 
norms, including examining the development of norms, their impact on behavior, and 
ways to eliminate detrimental effects of false beliefs. A clear understanding of the 
source and influence of norms for attitudes will enable psychologists to better cope with 
social problems. Ideally, this research should lead to intervention techniques designed to 
correct misperceptions. In closing, the social value of this research should not be 
overlooked.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: COLLEGE STUDENTS' OPINIONS CONCERNING CONTROVERSIAL 
SOCIAL ISSUES
We are interested in college students' beliefs about various social issues. Please 
take a few minutes to tell us your position on each topic. Circle yes or no to indicate 
your stance on each issue.
We would also like to get a measure of the impact of various groups on your 
position. So, for each issue, check all of the groups that you think have influenced 






F=Other college students 
G=Religious figures 
H=Media (e.g., TV,papers)
I AM IN FAVOR OF:
1. The right for a woman to 
choose an abortion. YES
2. The right for a person to 
have an assisted suicide 
(e.g., Dr. Kevorkian).YES
A B C D E F G  H
NO
NO
3. The option to choose the death 
penalty for criminals.YES NO
4. Animal research for 
medical purposes. YES NO
5. Animal research for 
cosmetics. YES NO
6. The right for homosexual 
couples to adopt children.
YES NO
7. Legalization and government 
regulation of drugs. YES NO
8. Pornography on the Internet.
YES NO
9. The use of the insanity plea 
in court. YES NO
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F=Other college students 
G=Reiigious figures 
H=Media (e.g., TV, papers)
AM IN FAVOR OF: H
10. “Gays in the military”
YES NO
11. Lower drinking age to 18.
YES NO
12. U.S. government money spent 
on aid to foreign countries.
YES NO
13. Mandatory seatbelt law.
YES NO
14. Ban on automatic gun sales.
YES NO
15. Ban on public smoking.
YES NO
16. Women allowed in combat.
YES NO
17. Free condom distribution 
in high schools.
YES NO
18. Affirmative action (racial 
quotas for employment.
YES NO
19. The right for homosexuals 
to legally marry. YES NO
20. Enforced prayer in
public schools. YES NO
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APPENDIX B: COLLEGE STUDENTS' OPINIONS CONCERNING CONTROVERSIAL
SOCIAL ISSUES - PEER ESTIMATES
We are interested in college students' beliefs about various social issues. Please 
take a few minutes to tell us what percentage of UNH students that you believe are i_n 
favor of each issue. Therefore, you should give a number ranging from 0 to 100, 
representing the percentage of your peers that you believe support that position.
Next, we would like to get a measure of your confidence in your judgment. On a 
scale from 1 (very uncertain) to 5 (very certain), please rate your estimates.
WHAT PERCENTAGE OF UNH STUDENTS ARE 
IN FAVOR OF:
The right for a woman to choose an abortion.
The right for a person to have an assisted suicide 
(e.g., Dr. Kevorkian).
The option to choose death penalty for criminals.
Animal research for medical purposes.
Animal research for cosmetics.
The right for homosexual couples to 
adopt children.
Legalization and government regulation of drugs.
Pornography on Internet.
The use of the insanity plea in court.
"Gays in military."
Lower drinking age to age 18.
US government money spent on aid 
to foreign countries
Mandatory seatbelt law
Ban on automatic gun sales.
Ban on public smoking.
Women allowed in combat
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APPENDIX B (con t.)
Affirmative action (racial quotas for employment. ____________ 1 2 3
The right for homosexuals to legally marry. ____________ 1 2 3
Enforced prayer in public schools.  1 2 3
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APPENDIX C: CONTROVERSIAL SITUATIONS
If you were in the following situations, decide how likely you would be to take the 
following actions. Again, you are not rating how likely it is that you would be in a given 
situation, but imagine that you are in this situation and decide how likely you would be to 
take each action. Please rate each response on a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 7 (very 
like ly).
VERY UNLIKELY UNSURE VERY LIKELY
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Go with a friend who was having an abortion.
VERY 
UNLIKELY 




Help a relative who desired an assisted suicide. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Choose the death penalty for a convicted rapist and murderer. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Donate money to animal research for cancer. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Buy health care (e.g., shampoo, mascara) products 
tested on animals.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Give up a child for adoption to a gay couple. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Smoke marijuana. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Allow a young relative access to pornography on the Internet. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Vote on a jury that a criminal was insane. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Vote for a law opposing gays in the military. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Buy beer for an underaged (under 21) friend. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Vote for a bill which allocates 10% of taxes 
for aid to foreign countries. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Drive a car without wearing a seatbelt. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Sign a petition banning gun sales. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Go only to 'non-smoking' restaurants and bars. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Convince a female friend that she should not fight in combat. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Distribute free condoms to high school seniors. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Work for a company that hires based on racial quotas. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Attend a homosexual wedding. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Leave the school room during prayer time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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APPENDIX D: CONTROVERSIAL SITUATIONS -  PEER ESTIMATES
For each of the following situations, answer if you would engage in the behavior. 
Then, estimate what percentage of UNH students peers would engage in each behavior on a 
scale from 0 to 100%.
WOULD YOU: PEER ESTIMATE(%)
Go with a friend who was having an abortion. YES NO
Help a relative who desired an assisted suicide. YES NO
Choose the death penalty for a convicted 
rapist and murderer.
YES NO
Donate money to animal research for cancer. YES NO
Buy health care (e.g., shampoo, mascara) 
products tested on animals.
YES NO
Give up a child for adoption to a gay couple. YES NO
Smoke marijuana. YES NO
Allow a young relative access to pornography 
on the Internet.
YES NO
Vote on a jury that a criminal was insane. YES NO
Vote for a law opposing gays in the military. YES NO
Buy beer for an underaged (under 21) friend. YES NO
Vote for a bill which allocates 10% of taxes 
for aid to foreign countries.
YES NO
Drive a car without wearing a seatbelt. YES NO
Sign a petition banning gun sales. YES NO
Go only to 'non-smoking' restaurants and bars. YES NO
Convince a female friend that she should not fight in combat
YES NO
Distribute free condoms to high school seniors. YES NO
Work for a company that hires based on racial quotas.
YES
Attend a homosexual wedding. YES
NO
NO
Leave the school room during prayer time. YES NO
126
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX E: ATTITUDES
Now we would like to get a measure of your degree of support for each topic. We 
would like you to rate the strength of your stance (e.g., do you strongly oppose abortion 
or are you mildly pro-choice?) on each issue. Please rate your attitude on a scale from 
-5 (strongly oppose) to +5 (strongly agree) with 0 meaning that you feel completely 




Right for a woman to choose an abortion. -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Right for a person to have an assisted
suicide (e.g., Dr. Kevorkian). -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Option to choose death penalty for criminals.
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Animal research for medical purposes. -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Animal research for cosmetics. -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
The right for homosexual couples to adopt children.
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Legalization and government regulation of drug sales.
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Freedom for pornography on the Internet. -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
The use of the insanity plea in court. -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
"Gays in military." -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Lower drinking age to age 18. -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
U.S. government money spent on aid to foreign countries.
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Mandatory seatbelt law. -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Ban on automatic gun sales. -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Ban on public smoking. -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Women allowed in combat. -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Free condom distribution in high schools. -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Affirmative action (racial quotas for employment).
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
The right for homosexuals to legally marry. -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Enforced prayer in public schools. -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
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APPENDIX F: SOURCE OF SOCIAL NORMS QUESTIONNAIRE
We would like to assess the importance of these groups. For each of the following 
sources, please rate the impact that they had on the development of your personal 
beliefs.
Not at all Very
influential influential
Parents 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Siblings 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Grandparents 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Close friends 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Significant others (e.g., boyfriend or girlfriend, spouse)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Other college students 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Teachers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Religious figures (e.g., priests) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Television 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Newspapers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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APPENDIX G: SOCIAL DESIRABILITY (Crowne & Marlowe, 1 9 6 0 )
Below are a number of statement concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read
each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you.
T F 1. Before voting, I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the 
candidates.
I  F 2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble.
T F 3. It is sometimes haid for me to go on with my work if I am not
encouraged.
T F 4. I have never intensely disliked anyone.
T F 5. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life.
T F 6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t  get my way.
T F 7. I am always careful about my manner of dress.
T F 8. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant.
T F 9. if I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen, I
would probably do it.
T F 10. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought
too little of my ability.
T F 11. 1 like to gossip at times.
T F 12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in
authority even though I knew they were right.
T F 13. No matter who I am talking to, I'm always a good listener.
T F 14. I can remember'playing sick1 to get out of something.
T F 15. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.
T F 16. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
T F 17. I always try to practice what I preach.
T F 18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud-mouthed,
obnoxious people.
T F 19. I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget.
T F 20. When I don't know something I don't at all mind admitting it.
T F 21. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.
T F 22. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way.
T F 23. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things.
T F 24. I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my
wrongdoings.
T F 25. I never resent being asked to return a favor.
T F 26. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different
from my own.
T F 27. I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car.
T F 28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of
others.
T F 29. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off.
T F 30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.
T F 31. 1 have never felt that I was punished without cause.
T F 32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune, they only got what
they deserved.
T F 33. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's
feelings.
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APPENDIX H: SELF-MONITORING SCALE (Snyder, 1 9 7 4 )
The statements that follow concern your personal reactions to a number of 
different situations. No two statements are exactly alike, so consider each statement 
carefully before answering. If a statement is TRUE or MOSTLY TRUE as applied to 
you, circle' T  to the left of the statement. If the statement is FALSE or MOSTLY 
FALSE as applied to you, circle 'F' to the left of the statement. It is important that you 
answer as frankly and honestly as you can.
T F 1 .1  find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.
T F 2. My behavior is usually an expression of my true inner feelings,
attitudes, and beliefs.
T F 3. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that
others will like.
T F 4. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe.
T F 5 .1  can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have no
information.
T F 6. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain people.
T F 7. When I am uncertain how to act in a social situation, I look to the behavior of
others for cues.
T F 8. I would probably make a good actor.
T F 9. I rarely seek the advice of my friends to choose movies, books, or
music.
T F 10. I sometimes appear to others to be experiencing deeper emotions that
I actually am.
T F 11.1 laugh more when I watch a comedy with others than alone.
T F 12. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.
T F 13. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very
different persons.
T F 14. I am not particularly good at making other people like me.
T F 15. Even if I am not enjoying myself, I often pretend to be having a good
time.
T F 16. I'm not always the person I appear to be.
T F 17. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to
please someone else or win their favor.
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APPENDIX H (c o n t.)
T F 18. I have considered being an entertainer.
T F 19. In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be what people expect me
to be rather than anything else.
T F 20. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational
acting.
T F 21.1 have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and
different situations.
T F 22. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.
T F 23. I feel a bit awkward in company and do not show up quite so well as I
should.
T F 24. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a
right end).
T F 25. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.
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APPENDIX I: Texas Social Behavior inventory (Helmreich & Stapp, 1974) 
Please read each item carefully and circle the number that best describes your
beliefs.
0 1 2  3 4
NOT AT ALL NOT SLIGHTLY FAIRLY VERY MUCH
CHARACTERISTIC VERY CHARACTERISTIC
OF ME OF ME
1. 1 am not likely to speak to people until they speak to me.
0 1 2 3 4
2. 1 would describe myself as self-confident. 0 1 2 3 4
3. 1 feel confident of my appearance. 0 1 2 3 4
4. 1 am a good mixer. 0 1 2 3 4
5. When in a group of people, 1 have difficulty thinking of the right thing to say.
0 1 2 3 4
6. When in a group of people, 1 usually do what the others want rather than make
suggestions. 0 1 2  3 4
7. When I am in a disagreement with other people, my opinion usually prevails.
0 1 2  3 4
8. I would describe myself as one who attempts to master situations.
0 1 2  3 4
9. Other people look up to me. 0 1 2  3 4
10. I enjoy social gatherings just to be with peopie.O 1 2  3 4
11.1 make a point of looking other people in the eye.O 1 2  3 4
12. I cannot seem to get others to notice me. 0 1 2  3 4
13. I would rather not have very much responsibility for other people.
0 1 2  3 4
14. I feel comfortable being approached by someone in a position of authority.
0 1 2 3 4
15. 1 would describe myself as indecisive. 0 1 2 3 4
16. 1 have no doubts about my social competence. 0 1 2 3 4
17. 1 would describe myself as socially unskilled. 0 1 2 3 4
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APPENDIX I (cont.)
0 1 2  3 4
NOT AT ALL NOT SLIGHTLY FAIRLY VERY MUCH
CHARACTERISTIC VERY CHARACTERISTIC
OF ME OF ME
18. I frequently find it difficult to defend my point of view when confronted with the 
opinions of others. 0 1 2  3 4
19. I would be willing to describe myself as a pretty 'strong' personality.
0 1 2  3 4
20. When I work on a committee, I like to take charge of things.
0 1 2  3
21.1 usually expect to succeed in the things I do. 0 1 2 3
22. I feel comfortable approaching someone in a position of authority over me.
0 1 2  3
23. I enjoy being around other people, and seek out social encounters frequently.
0 1 2  3
24. I feel confident of my social behavior. 0 1 2  3
25. I feel I can confidently approach and deal with anyone I meet.
0 1 2  3
26. I would describe myself as happy. 0 1 2 3
27. I enjoy being in front of large audiences. 0 1 2  3 4
28. When I meet a stranger, I often think that he is better than I am.
0 1 2  3 4
29. It is hard for me to start a conversation with strangers.
0 1 2  3 4
30. People seem naturally to turn to me when decisions have to be made.
0 1 2  3 4
31. I feel secure in social situations. 0 1 2  3 4
32. I like to exert my influence over other people. 0 1 2  3 4
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APPENDIX J: DEMOGRAPHICS 
Please answer the following questions about yourself.
1. My age is.
2. My gender is _
3. I am a college
4. My religion is












. Native American 
. Other (please specify):
6 . My major is
7. My SAT scores were. Verbal and









For the next two questions, please choose one of the following responses.
9.
10..
.a. I believe that I am similar to most of my peers.
_b. I believe that I am different from most of my peers.
_ a. In general, I think that most college students try to be similar to their 
peers.
_ b. In general, I think that most college students try to be unique from their 
peers.
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APPENDIX K: STUDY 3
ANIMAL RESEARCH 
AGAINST
"Fifty million animals are killed annually in U.S. labs for medical and scientific 
research. People who support animal research have always reduced the debate to the 
idea that the only hope for human beings with horrible diseases lies in discovering a 
cure through animal research. But today the truth of the matter is that animal research 
is unnecessary."
In the late 1800s, researchers made convincing arguments that animal 
experimentation was indispensable to human health because it was primarily concerned 
with germs and infectious diseases, such as malaria and smallpox. In the past two 
decades, this emphasis has changed. Infectious diseases have been replaced by non- 
infectious, chronic degenerative diseases, such as cancer, strokes, heart attacks, 
diabetes, AIDS, and drug addiction. Most of these illnesses are tied to a complex set of 
factors including lifestyle, heredity, and the environment. These diseases are 
completely different from infectious diseases, which are caused by a single germ which 
can be isolated and treated accordingly. However, the medical field has stood by the 
animal testing model despite its inapplicability to the diseases of today. Billions of tax 
dollars are spent by scientists attempting to create animal models of every conceivable 
human problem, including sexual impotence and manic depression.
Five billion dollars are spent annually in government grants paid by taxpayers 
for medical research. All of this money is not helping to eliminate the major health 
crises of today. Cancer death rates have increased for decades. The 1985 death rate of 
461,000 is 4 times the annual total from 50 years ago. Heart disease kills 770,000  
each year. Even though cancer and heart disease are known to be up to 80% preventable, 
they are the areas in which the most tax dollars are spent and the most animals killed. 
This misdirection of resources is causing America to fall behind in medical advances 
(20th in male life expectancy, 23rd in infant mortality). Instead of creating diseases in 
animals, researchers should be preventing them in humans.
You can't mimic human diseases in animals because of the physiological 
differences in species. Furthermore, the spontaneous disease process can't be studied in 
animals which are methodically given the diseases. Lavish amounts of money are spent 
on carcinogencity studies in animals to identify substances likely to cause cancer in 
humans. Mice and rats are most often used. A recent study found that 46% of substances 
deemed carcinogenic in one were safe in the other. So, how can we apply these findings to 
people. Also, if we can't understand the cause, what about finding a cure?
Drugs found effective in animals need not work in people. Eleven billion dollars 
have been spend on cancer research, but animal experimentation has not produced a 
single substantial advance in the prevention or treatment of cancer. Of the 10 most 
effective cancer drugs, not one was discovered through animal experimentation. Despite 
years of epidemiological studies and autopsy results showing that cigarette smoking 
causes lung cancer, health warnings were delayed and thousands died because of the 
difficulty in inducing smoking-caused cancer in lab animals.
SOURCE: This information was taken directly from Steve Siegal, an animals rights 
activist. Utne Reader 10:47-49, S/O, 1989
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ANIMAL RESEARCH 
FOR
"We have witnessed an extraordinary outpouring of new drugs, devices, and 
procedures to relieve human suffering and save lives," says Dr. Edward N. Brant, Jr., 
former Reagan Administration Assistant Secretary for Health and Human Services.
"Very few of these advancements - maybe none of them - would have been possible 
without the use of vertebrate animals somewhere along the research path." 
Knowledgeable people agree. Judy Rosner, executive director of the United Parkinson 
Foundation, says "there is no way that further research can be done on Parkinson's 
disease without laboratory animals." Adds Dr. Leon Stemfeld, medical director of the 
United Cerebral Palsy Research and Education Foundation, "Without animal research, the 
various types of preventative measures that we now have would not have been possible."
To date, 41 Nobel prizes have been awarded to scientists whose achievements 
depended, at least in part, on using lab animals. Vaccines against polio, diphtheria, 
mumps, measles, rubella and smallpox would not have been possible without such 
experiments. Techniques such as open heart surgeiy, brain surgery, coronary bypass, 
organ transplants, and correction of congenital heart disease were developed with the 
assistance of animal research. Insulin to control diabetes and medications for asthma, 
epilepsy, arthritis, ulcers, and hypertension were created using animal research. It is 
safe to say that if you are an American alive today, you most likely have benefited from 
animal research.
Animal research has played a vital role in the treatment of heart disease, the 
leading cause (nearly 40%) of deaths in the U.S. As a result of studies into causes, 
treatment, and prevention, the number of women killed by heart disease has declined by 
two percent a year since the early 1950s, while the number of men dying has been 
declining by the same rate since the late 1960s. Dr. John Powell, an associate professor 
at Harvard University and president of the Massachusetts Heart Association claims that 
"heart disease is the number one killer in this country, and researchers trying to do 
something about the problem are having their hands tied [by animal rights activists]."
Often, the animal rightists are, at best, misinformed. They claim that the 
number of animals used in scientific experiments is increasing; figures offered range 
up to 100 million animals used annually. In fact, the only recent study of biomedical 
research was issued by the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment and states that, by the 
best current estimates, the number of animals used is between 17 and 22 million, which 
is a decline from 38 million in 1968, according to a study by the National Academy of 
Sciences.
In addition, animal rights activists repeatedly imply that experiments are 
performed on pets. Actually, approximately 90% of the animals used in research are 
rats, mice, and other rodents, while less than 1% are dogs and cats. Another 
misconception purports that other research methods can replace the use of animals in 
biomedical research. Unfortunately, there are no real alternatives to the use of animals 
in biomedical research. Some developments such as tissue and cell cultures and 
computer models have supplemented animal research, but these techniques cannot 
replace the use of live animals. Therefore, animal research is essential, but it is 
carefully controlled and regulated.
SOURCE: Material taken directly from Frankie L. Trull, president of the Foundation for 
Biomedical Research, NY. Reprinted from USA today, March 1988, p.52
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APPENDIX L: STUDY 3
LEGALIZATION OF DRUGS 
FOR
The drug trade has created enormous opportunities for organized crime. A report 
by Wharton Econometrics for the President's Commission on Organized Crime identified 
the sale of illicit drugs as the source of more than half of all organized crime revenues. 
The involvement of organized crime has led to well-publicized levels of violence that 
have become everyday fare in the drug trade.
Enormous profits have made widespread corruption in law enforcement all but 
inevitable. One conservative estimate is that at least 30 percent of the nation's police 
officers have had some form of involvement with illicit drugs since becoming employed 
in law enforcement The motivation for succumbing to corruption will remain 
overwhelming as long as staggering sums of money are offered as an alternative to 
risking one's life in effective efforts to prevent relatively minor offenses.
Furthermore, billions of dollars are spent each year on law enforcement in an attempt to 
eliminate drug trafficking. Courts and jails have become clogged as a result of "get 
tough" policies toward drug offenders. Federal courts have become 'drug courts', where 
narcotics prosecutions now account for 44 percent of ail criminal trials, up 229 
percent in the past decade.
Many drugs tend to be expensive not because of their production costs, but 
because of their illegality. According to one estimate, the price of heroin is 
approximately two hundred times greater than it would be under a free market of supply 
and demand. As a result, many users commit property offenses in order to obtain money 
to buy drugs. Legal drugs would be cheaper, so users would be less likely to commit 
crimes to purchase them.
Removal of the enormous profits in the sale of illegal drugs might motivate 
persons to better prepare themselves to make an honest living. The existence of a 
lucrative black market for drugs may have contributed more to deterioration in 
education than the drugs themselves.
Making drugs illegal may glamorize drugs by creating the "forbidden fruit" 
phenomenon. Illegality stimulates curiosity and desire, especially among persons who 
regard themselves as unconventional and rebellious. After marijuana was 
decriminalized in the Netherlands, one writer commented, "Decriminalization of 
marijuana makes marijuana boring."
The interest in minimizing availability has discouraged illegal drugs from being 
used for legitimate medical purposes. Doctors are unable to prescribe marijuana to 
patients suffering from debilitating diseases such as cancer, glaucoma, and multiple 
sclerosis, where it has been shown to have beneficial effects.
Medical complications of drug consumption have been compounded by 
criminalization. Many drug users have died from complications resulting from impure 
supplies. Furthermore, drug users are reluctant to seek treatment because of the stigma 
of illegality. The night that basketball star Len Bias died of heart failure after using 
cocaine, his friends, fearing the police, waited until his third seizure before calling an 
ambulance.
SOURCE: This material was taken directly from Douglas H. Husak, Drugs and Rights, 
1992
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LEGALIZATION OF DRUGS 
AGAINST
Drug use should be prohibited because it is harmful to users themselves. 
Legalizing drugs would make them more accessible and compound their negative effects. 
The table presented below gives details concerning the detrimental effects of various 
illicit drugs. (Source: Alcohol and Other Drugs: Risky Business, American College 
Health Association).
I Drag Type Name Most Common Complications/Long-Term Effects '1
Stimulants
Amphet2~ir.es* Benzedrine. Dexedrine 
Methedrine. diet puls, 
MDMA (Erstacy)
Nervousness. paranoia, hauucnations. dizziness, tremors, deceased mental ability, 
sexual impotence, insomnia, skin disorders, malnutrition, delusions, psychosis, seizures, 
death
Cocaine* cocaine powcer, cack , 
freesased coke
Tremors, nasal bieeding and infammation. toxic psychosis, seizures, damage to nasal 
septum and bicod vessels, death from overdose (hear: cr respirator,- failure}
Nicotine cigarettes, cigars, pipes, 
snuff, chewing tobacco
High biccc pressure, emphysema, bronchitis, heart and iur.g disease, cancer, death.
Caffeine Coffee, coia. r.o*Doz, ter Nervousness, insomnia, dehycradon. stomach imitation, fatigue
Depressants 
. Alcohoi* beer, wine, licucr, some 
medications
Dehydration, hangover, overdose or mixing with other depressants can cause respira- 
tory failure, obesity, impotence, psychcsis. ulcers, malnutrition, liver and brain damage, 
delirium tam ers, death
Tranquilizers* Vaiium, librium , 
Equanil. Miiicwn, 
Thorazine
Hangover, menstual irregularities, increases or deceases efr'ec of other cm tp. 





Lethargy, hangover, fciurred vision, nausea, depresrion. seizures, excessive sleepiness, 
confusion, irritability, severe withdrawal sickness; can be fetal if mixed with alcohoi or 
other depressants
Narcotics’ Heroine, morphine, 
opium, codeine, 
methadone. Demerol
Respirator.- and crculatcrv deutessicn. d:~ 'ness. vomidne. sweatins. dr,- mouth, 
lowered libido, lethargy, consriparion, weigh: less, temporary sterility and impotence, 
withdrawal sickness, stupor, death.
Inhalants’ amyl nitrate, butyl 
nitrate, nitrous oxide, 
glue and paint
Nitrates, headache, dizriness, acc^-mtsd heart rate, nausea, nasal criterion, couch. Ics: 
erecdon, hallucnadons; liver, kidney, fccne-marrow and brain damage; death
K alludncger.
Psychedelics
Cannabis* Marijuana, hashish, 
TKC
Impaired driving a'cilir/, pcssibie lung damage, reduced sperm count and sperm 
mcriiity; damage from impure dose
* Impair- driving 
abiiicv
LSD, psiiccycin. MDA, 
peyote, DNfT, ST?
Depression, paranoia, physical exhausricr after use. psychosis ("freaidng cud*) 
exaggerated body distcrrieo: fears of death, flashback, adverse drug rescuer., psychosis
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APPENDIX L (cont.)
In tests conducted during the last eight years at Manhattan Central Booking, 
between 60 and 83 percent of arrestees have tested positive for cocaine. This statistic 
suggests that there might be a strong connection between crime and drug use. (Source: 
William J. Bratton, Commissioner of the New York City Police, Boston Globe, December 
24, 1995).
The NIDA Drug Abuse Warning Network reported an estimated 400,000  
admissions to hospital emergency rooms nationwide that involved drug abuse in 1991. A 
total of 6,601 drug-abuse related deaths were reported in 1991 by 130 medical 
examiners in 27 metropolitan areas. (Source: 1994 World Almanac, Funk and 
Wagnalls Corporation)
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APPENDIX M: STUDY 3
KNOWLEDGE QUIZ (A )
1. Name three accomplishments which were not possible without the assistance of 
animal research.
2. List two arguments discussed which suggest that animal testing is unnecessary.
KNOWLEDGE QUIZ (B)
1. List two arguments discussed which suggest that animal testing is unnecessary.
2. Name three accomplishments which were not possible without the assistance of 
animal research.
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APPENDIX N: STUDY 3
KNOWLEDGE QUIZ (A )
1. List two arguments which support the legalization of drugs.
2. Name three harmful effects of illegal drugs.
KNOWLEDGE QUIZ (B)
1. Name three harmful side effects of illegal drugs.
2. List two arguments which support the legalization of drugs.
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